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Abstract. The Turing Test is one of the most disputed topics in artificial intelligence, philosophy of
mind, and cognitive science. This paper is a review of the past 50 years of the Turing Test. Philo-
sophical debates, practical developments and repercussions in related disciplines are all covered. We
discuss Turing’s ideas in detail and present the important comments that have been made on them.
Within this context, behaviorism, consciousness, the ‘other minds’ problem, and similar topics in
philosophy of mind are discussed. We also cover the sociological and psychological aspects of the
Turing Test. Finally, we look at the current situation and analyze programs that have been developed
with the aim of passing the Turing Test. We conclude that the Turing Test has been, and will continue
to be, an influential and controversial topic.
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1. Introduction
This is the story of the Turing Test: a modest attempt to summarize its 50 years of
existence.
The British mathematician Alan Turing1 proposed the Turing Test (TT) as a
replacement for the question "Can machines think?" in his 1950Mindarticle ‘Com-
puting Machinery and Intelligence’ (Turing, 1950). Since then, Turing’s ideas have
been widely discussed, attacked, and defended over and over. At one extreme,
Turing’s paper has been considered to represent the "beginning" of artificial in-
telligence (AI) and the TT has been considered its ultimate goal. At the other
extreme, the TT has been called useless, even harmful. In between are arguments
on consciousness, behaviorism, the ‘other minds’ problem, operational definitions
of intelligence, necessary and sufficient conditions for intelligence-granting, and
so on.
The aim of this paper is to present an overview of the debate that followed
Turing’s paper, as well as the developments that have taken place in the past 50
years. We have tried to make this survey as comprehensive and multi-disciplinary
as possible. Familiarity with special terms and concepts is not assumed. The reader
is directed to further references where they are available. While the review is not
strictly chronological, we have tried to present related works in the order they
appeared.
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In our attempt to make this survey complete, we have explored a large number
of references. However, this does not mean that we comment on each paper that
mentions the TT. We devote separate sections to certain papers, discuss some others
briefly, and merely cite the remaining. Some papers are explained in detail because
they are representative of important ideas. From this it should not be understood
that the papers for which we spare less space are less important or interesting. In
fact, we sometimes devote more space to papers that are not discussed in detail
elsewhere.2
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the TT and
analyzes ‘Computing Machinery and Intelligence’ (Turing, 1950). In this section,
we also attempt to develop new ideas and probe side issues. Section 3 describes
and explains some of the earlier comments on the TT (those from the 60’s and the
70’s). In Section 4, we analyze the arguments that are more recent. We study the
repercussions of the TT in the social sciences separately in Section 5. Similarly, in
Section 6, we give an overview of the concrete, computational studies directed to-
wards passing the TT. Some natural language conversation systems and the annual
Loebner Prize contests are discussed in this section. Finally, Section 7 concludes
our survey.
2. Turing’s ‘Computing Machinery and Intelligence’
It makes sense to look at Turing’s landmark paper ‘Computing Machinery and
Intelligence’ (Turing, 1950) before we begin to consider certain arguments defend-
ing, attacking or discussing the TT. Turing (1950) is a very well-known work and
has been cited and quoted copiously. Although what follows will provide an intro-
duction to the TT, it is a good idea to read Turing’s original rendering of the issues
at hand. In analyzing the 50 years of the TT, it is important to distinguish what
was originally proposed by Turing himself and what has been added on afterwards.
We do not mean that the TT is (or should remain as) what Turing proposed in
‘Computing Machinery and Intelligence’. Like any other concept, it has changed
throughout the 50 years it has been around. In fact, one of the purposes of this paper
is to trace the stepsin this evolution. Thus, it is only natural that we are interested
in the original version.
In Section 2.1, we analyze Turing’s original proposal. We summarize Turing’s
replies to certain objections to his ideas in Section 2.2. Turing’s opinions on learn-
ing machines are briefly discussed in Section 2.3. Finally, we list some of Turing’s
predictions in Section 2.4.
2.1. THE IMITATION GAME
Turing’s aim is to provide a method to assess whether or not a machine can think.
He states at the beginning of his paper that the question "Can machines think?" is
a highly ambiguous one. He attempts to transform this into a more concrete form
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Figure 1. The Imitation Game: Stage 1.
by proposing what is called the Imitation Game (IG). The game is played with a
man (A), a woman (B) and an interrogator (C) whose gender is unimportant. The
interrogator stays in a room apart from A and B. The objective of the interrogator
is to determine which of the other two is the woman while the objective of both the
man and the woman is to convince the interrogator that he/she is the woman and
the other is not. This situation is depicted in Figure 1.
The means through which the decision, the convincing, and the deception are to
take place is a teletype connection. Thus, the interrogator asks questions in written
natural language and receives answers in written natural language. Questions can
be on any subject imaginable, from mathematics to poetry, from the weather to
chess.
According to Turing, the new agenda to be discussed, instead of the equivocal
"Can machines think?", can be ‘What will happen when a machine takes the part
of A in this game? Will the interrogator decide wrongly as often when the game is
played like this as he does when the game is played between a man and a woman?’
(Turing, 1950, p. 434). Figure 2 depicts the new situation.
At one point in the paper Turing replaces the question "Can machines think?"
by the following:
‘Let us fix our attention to one particular digital computerC. Is it true that
by modifying this computer to have an adequate storage, suitably increasing
its speed of action and providing it with an appropriate programme,C can be
made to play satisfactorily the part ofA in the imitation game,the part of B
being taken by a man?’ (Turing, 1950, p. 442, emphasis added).
Notice that the woman has disappeared altogether. But the objectives ofA, B,
and the interrogator remain unaltered; at least Turing does not explicitly state any
change. Figure 3 shows this situation.
There seems to be an ambiguity in the paper; it is unclear which of the scenarios
depicted in Figure 2 and Figure 3 is to be used. In any case, as it is now generally
understood, what the TT really tries to assess is the machine’s ability to imitate a
human being, rather than its ability to simulate a woman. Most subsequent remarks
on the TT ignore the gender issue and assume that the game is played between a
machine (A), a human (B), and an interrogator (C). In this version, C’s aim is to
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Figure 2. The Imitation Game: Stage 2, Version 1.
Figure 3. The Imitation Game: Stage 2, Version 2.
determine which one of the two entities he/she is conversing with is the human
(Figure 4).
One may ask why Turing designed the IG in such a peculiar manner. Why the
fuss about the woman, the man, and the replacement? This does not make the
paper easier to understand. He could have introduced the IG exactly as he did
with the woman-man issue replaced by the human-machine issue and it obviously
would not be any more confusing. The main reason that the decision concerning
machine thought is to be based on imitating a woman in the game is probably not
that Turing believed the ultimate intellectual challenge to be the capacity to act like
a woman (although it may be comforting to entertain the thought). Conversely, it
may be concluded that Turing believes that women can be imitated by machines
while men cannot. The fact that Turing stipulated the man to be replaced by the
machine (when he might just as easily have required the woman to be replaced by
the machine or added a remark that the choice was inconsequential) raises such
questions, but let us not digress.
Here is our explanation of Turing’s design: The crucial point seems to be that the
notion of imitation figures more prominently in Turing’s paper than is commonly
acknowledged. For one thing, the game is inherently about deception. The man
is allowed to say anything at all in order to cause the interrogator to make the
wrong identification, while the woman is actually required to aid the interrogator.3
In the machine vs. woman version, the situation remains the same. The machine
tries to convince the interrogator that it is the woman. What is really judging the
machine’s competence is not the woman it is playing against. Turing’s seemingly
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Figure 4. The Imitation Game as it is generally interpreted (The Turing Test).
frivolous requirements may actually have very sound premises. Neither the man in
the gender-based IG nor any kind of machine is a woman. On close examination, it
can be seen that what Turing proposes is to compare the machine’s success against
that of the man,not to look at whether it ‘beats’ the woman in the IG.4 The man
and the machine are measured in terms of their respective performances against real
women. In Figure 3, we see that the woman has disappeared from the game, but the
objective for both the machine and the man is still imitating a woman. Again, their
performance is comparable because they are both simulating something which they
are not.
The quirks of the IG may well be concealing a methodological fairness beyond
that explicitly stated by Turing. We hold that the IG, even though it is regarded
as obscure by many, is a carefully planned proposal. It provides a fair basis for
comparison: the woman (either as a participant in the game or as a concept) acts as
a neutral point so that the two imposters can be assessed in how well they "fake".
Turing could have defined the game to be played with two people, too; one
being an interrogator, as in the original, and the other being either a man or a
woman. The interrogator would then have to decide whether the subject is a man
or a woman. Alternatively, the TT for machine intelligence can be re-interpreted as
a test to assess a machine’sability to pass for a human being. This issue may seem
immaterial at first. However, the interrogator’s decision is sure to be affected by the
availability (or lack) of comparison. Whether the machine’s task will be easier or
more difficult in this latter case is another question. We think that Turing implies
that some comparison should be available; otherwise, he would have opted for the
two-person version of the game. Once again, we believe that the most sensible
reason behind the three-person game is to have a neutral party so as to allow the
assessment of the impersonating parties with respect to each other.
In any case, as was mentioned before, the TT concept has evolved through time.
Turing’s original IG and its conditions do not put serious constraints on current dis-
cussions about the test. It is generally agreed that the gender issue and the number
of participants are not to be followed strictly in attempts to pass, criticize or defend
the TT. Even Turing himself, in the subsequent sections of ‘Computing Machinery
and Intelligence’, sometimes ignores these issues and focuses on the question:
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"Can machines communicate in natural language in a manner indistinguishable
from that of a human being?". This is manifested in the example conversation he
gives in Turing (1950, p. 434), which contains questions about poetry, mathematics,
and chess – topics that one would not typically ask about in order to determine
someone’s gender. This may be a hint that the gender issue in the IG is indeed for
purposes of fair comparison.
After defining the IG, Turing defends the choice of replacing the question "Can
machines think?" with "Can machines play the imitation game?". The new problem
focuses on intellectual capacities and does not let physical aspects interfere with
granting intelligence to an entity. Nor does it limit thinking to specific tasks like
playing chess or solving puzzles, since the question-and-answer method is suitable
to introduce any topic imaginable.
An issue that is open to discussion is what Turing implies abouth wmachines
should be built or programmed to play the IG successfully. He seems to believe that
if a machine can be constructed to play the game successfully, it does not really
matter whether or not what it does to that end is similar to what a human does.
Turing even considers the possibility that a machine which successfully plays the
IG cannot be explained by its creators because it had been built by experimental
methods. However, he explicitly states that ‘it will be assumed that the best strategy
is to try to provide answers that would naturally be given by a man’ (Turing,
1950, p. 435). It may be concluded that Turing does not put any limitations on
how to model human cognitive processes, but seems to discourage any approach
that deviates too much from the "human ways", possibly because he feels it is
unlikely that satisfactory solutions can be obtained in this manner. On the other
hand, by not committing himself to any extreme viewpoint on the issue, he accepts
the possibility that machines not mimicking human cognitive processes at all can
also pass the test.
Some people interpret the TT as a setting in which you can "cheat". The game
has no rules constraining the design of the machines. At some places in the paper,
Turing describes how machines could be "rigged" to overcome certain obstacles
proposed by opponents of the idea that machines can think. A very obvious ex-
ample is about machines making mistakes. When the machine is faced with an
arithmetical operation, in order not to give away its identity by being fast and
accurate, it can pause for about 30 seconds before responding and occasionally
give a wrong answer. Being able to carry out arithmetical calculations fast and
accurately is generally considered intelligent behavior.5 However, Turing wishes
to sacrifice this at the expense of human-ness. Some commentators think this is
"cheating". The machine is resorting to certain "tricks" in its operations rather
than imitating the human ways. However, arithmetic is a highly specific domain.
Modifying the programs in this manner cannot hurt: If a machine can pass the test,
it can then be re-programmed not to cheat at arithmetic. If it does not resort to this,
the interrogator can ask a difficult arithmetical problem as his/her first question and
decide that he/she is dealing with a machine right then and there. We believe the
TURING TEST: 50 YEARS LATER 469
best way to think about this issue is considering this as "deception", rather than as
"cheating". After all, in a sense, the game is all about deception.
It can be seen that Turing considers it possible that a sufficiently human-like
machine (i.e., a machine that is sufficiently good at playing the IG) is bound to
make such mistakes as we attribute to humans, without such explicit tricks en-
coded by its constructors. This idea may seem extravagant, but considering the
high level of sophistication required from a machine for passing the TT, it should
not be dismissed as impossible. A striking example can be given from the inductive
learning domain: No learning algorithm guarantees correct results on unseen data.
Moreover, in some cases a computer errs in ways that cannot be foreseen, or even
understood by its programmer. This can be distressing for machine learning re-
searchers who are after a minimal number of mistakes, but proves the subtle point
that machines can make mistakes without explicitly being shownhow to.6
Turing’s approach towards deception seems similar to Adam Smith’s "invisible
hand" from economics. Maybe Turing’s conformity has its roots in his belief that
one cannot go too far by such attempts: He may regard tricks as a last retouch,
something to smooth out the machine-ness of the resulting programs that otherwise
handle the more important aspects of human cognition. If a program that has its
very bases in what some have called "cheating" can pass the TT, maybe we would
have to revise some notions about the human intellect. It is not possible to say what
Turing was thinking and claim to be absolutely correct. It seems as if he would
be content with a machine that plays the IG successfully no matter what the inner
mechanisms are.
2.2. CONTRARY VIEWS AND TURING’ S REPLIES
Turing was aware that some of his ideas would be opposed at the time he wrote
‘Computing Machinery and Intelligence’ (Turing, 1950) and he responded to some
objections that he believed his work would be confronted with. In fact, he discusses
some of these earlier in Turing (1969).7 We direct the reader to Turing (1950) for
the answers to thetheological objection, and theargument from extra-sensory per-
ceptionfor these are rather irrelevant to the current work. However, the remaining
objections are worth commenting on.
The ‘heads in the sand’ objection, although mostly in disguised forms, is mani-
fested in some subsequent comments on the TT. This is, in its basic form, an
aversion to the issue of thinking machines because the consequences of this would
be dreadful (Turing, 1950, p. 444). Most people like to believe that humans are
"special" and thinking is considered to be one of the most important traits that
make us so. To some, the idea of sharing such a "human" ability with machines
is not a pleasant thought. This outlook was probably more widespread in Turing’s
time than it is now. Turing believes that this argument is not even worth refutation,
and with a little sarcasm, he states that consolation (perhaps in the transmigration
of souls) is more appropriate (Turing, 1950, p. 444).
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There are some theorems showing that the powers of discrete-state machines
are limited. The most famous of these is probably Gödel’s Theorem which shows
that in consistent logical systems of sufficient power, we can formulate statements
that cannot be proved or disproved within the system. An application of this result
to the IG is outlined in Turing (1950, p. 445) and the reader is referred to Lucas
(1961) and Lucas (1996) for more on the implications of Gödel’s Theorem for
machine thought.
Turing studies such results under the title themathematical objection. He states
that ‘although it is established that there are limitations to the powers of any par-
ticular machine, it has only been stated, without any sort of proof, that no such
limitations apply to the human intellect’ (Turing, 1950, p. 445). Elsewhere, he
notes that those arguments that rest on Gödel’s and similar theorems are taking
it for granted that the machine to be granted intelligence must not make mistakes,
and that he does not believe this should be a requirement for intelligence (Turing,
1969).
Perhaps the most important objection is theargument from consciousness. Some
people believe that machines should be conscious (e.g., aware of their accomplish-
ments, feel pleasure at success, get upset at failure, etc.) in order to have minds. At
the extreme of this view, we findsolipsism. The only way toreally know whether a
machine is thinking or not is tobe that machine. However, according to this view,
the only way to know another human being is thinking (or is conscious, happy, etc.)
is to be that human being. This is usually called theother minds problemand will
show up several times in the discussions of the TT. ‘Instead of arguing continually
over this point it is usual to have the polite convention that everyone thinks’ (Tur-
ing, 1950, p. 446). Turing’s response to the argument from consciousness is simple,
but powerful: The alternative to the IG (or similar behavioral assessments) would
be solipsism and we do not practice this against other humans. It is only fair that
in dealing with machine thought, we abandon the consciousness argument rather
than concede to solipsism.
Turing believes that the IG setting can be used to determine whether ‘someone
really understands something or has learnt it parrot fashion’ as is manifested in the
sample conversation he gives in Turing (1950, p. 446). It should also be noted that
Turing states that he does not assume consciousness to be a trivial or impertinent
issue; he merely believes that we do not necessarily need to solve its mysteries
before we can answer questions about thinking, and in particular, machine thought
(Turing, 1950, p. 447).
The arguments from various disabilitiesare of the sort "machines can never
do X", whereX can be any human trait such as having a sense of humor, being
creative, falling in love, or enjoying strawberries. As Turing also notes (Turing,
1950, p. 449), such criticisms are sometimes disguised forms of the argument from
consciousness. Turing argues against some of theseX’s such as the ability to make
mistakes, enjoy strawberries and cream, be the subject of its own thought, etc. in
Turing (1950, pp. 448–450).
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Lady Lovelace‘s objectionis similar; it states that machines cannot originate
anything, can never do anything new, can never surprise us. Turing replies by
confessing that machines do take him by surprise quite often. Proponents of Lady
Lovelace’s objection can say that ‘such surprises are due to some creative men-
tal act on [Turing’s] part, and reflect no credit on the machine’ (Turing, 1950,
p. 451). Turing’s answer to this is similar to the one he gives to the argument from
consciousness: ‘The appreciation of something as surprising requires as much of a
‘creative mental act’ whether the surprising event originates from a man, a book, a
machine or anything else’ (Turing, 1950, p. 451).
Turing also considers theargument from continuity in the nervous system. As
the name suggests, this objection states that it is impossible to model the behavior
of the nervous system on a discrete-state machine because the former is continu-
ous. However, Turing believes that the activity of a continuous machine can be
"discretized" in a manner that the interrogator cannot notice during the 1G.
Finally, there is theargument from informality of behavior. Intuitively, it seems
that it is not possible to come up with a set of rules that describe what a person
would do in every situation imaginable. In very simple terms, some people believe
the following: ‘If each man had a definite set of rules of conduct by which he
regulated his life, he would be no better than a machine. But there are no such
rules, so men cannot be machines’ (Turing, 1950, p. 452). First, Turing notes that
there might be a confusion between ‘rules of conduct’ and ‘laws of behavior’. By
the former he means actions that one can perform and be aware of (like, ‘If you see
a red light, stop’) and by the latter he means laws of nature that apply to a man’s
body (such as ‘If you throw a dart at him, he will duck’). Now it is not evident
that a complete set of laws of behavior do not exist. We can find some of these
by scientific observation but there will not come a time when we can be confident
that we have searched enough and there are no such rules. Another point Turing
makes is that it may not always be possible to predict the future behavior of a
discrete-state machine by observing its actions. In fact, he is so confident about a
certain program that he set up on the Manchester computer that he ‘def[ies] anyone
to learn from [its] replies sufficient about the programme to be able to predict any
replies to untried values’ (Turing, 1950, p. 453).
2.3. LEARNING MACHINES
Turing devotes some space to the idea ofeducation of machineryin ‘Computing
Machinery and Intelligence’ (Turing, 1950). He also discusses the issue in his
earlier work ‘Intelligent Machinery’ (Turing, 1969).
According to Turing, in trying to imitate an adult human mind, we should con-
sider three issues: the initial state of the mind, the education it has been subject to,
and other experience it has been subject to (that cannot be described as education).
Then we might try to model a child’s mind and "educate" it to obtain the model
of the adult brain. Since ‘presumably the child-brain is something like a note-
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book as one buys it from the stationers; rather little mechanism and lots of blank
sheets’ (Turing, 1950, p. 456), developing a program that simulates it is bound to be
easier.8 Of course, the education is another issue. Turing proposes some methods
of education for the child-machines (such as a reward/punishment based approach)
in Turing (1950, pp. 456–460) and Turing (1969, pp. l7–23).
Turing’s opinions on learning machines are rather interesting, especially con-
sidering he wrote these more than 50 years ago. In most places when he discusses
education of machines, there is a noticeable change in Turing’s style. He seems
to believe that the way to success in developing a program that plays the IG well
is probably to follow the human model as closely as possible. As was mentioned
in Section 2.1, he does not put any constraints on how to design the IG-playing
machine, but the fact that he describes learning machines in substantial detail seems
to suggest that he may prefer such an approach.
In any case, Turing believes ‘if we are trying to produce an intelligent machine,
and arefollowing the human model as closely as we can’ (Turing, 1969, p. 14,
emphasis added) a good (and fair) approach would be to allow the machine to
learn just like humans.
2.4. TURING’ S PREDICTIONS
Turing’s paper (Turing, 1950) contains some very bold statements on the prospects
for machine intelligence. Most of these probably seemed like science fiction at the
time. Even now, some of us would consider these far-fetched. This section provides
a sample of Turing’s predictions.
It is well known that Turing believes computers to be capable of performing
many "intelligent" tasks. He also thinks that they will be able to do so in a "human"
way.
The reader must accept it as a fact that digital computers can be construc-
ted, and indeed have been constructed, according to the principles we have
described, and that they can in fact mimic the actions of a human computer
very closely (Turing, 1950, p. 438).
As can be seen from the following quotation, Turing believes that the difficulties
in designing thinking machines are not insurmountable.
As I have explained, the problem is mainly one of programming. Advances in
engineering will have to be made too, but it seems unlikely that these will not
be adequate for the requirements (Turing, 1950, p. 455).
While trying to convince the reader that the ideas he proposes are of the sort that
can be realized in the foreseeable future, Turing mentions some concrete achieve-
ments he expects from computers. Those that are related to machine learning were
outlined in Section 2.3. Here is another example, this time pertaining to automated
software engineering:
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[The machine] may be used to help in making up its own programmes, or to
predict the effect of alterations in its own structure.
. . .
These are possibilities of the near future, rather than Utopian dreams (Turing,
1950, p. 449).
The game of chess has been at the center of some of the most well-known
achievements in AI. Today, computer programs play against world champions and
sometimes even beat them. Spectacular advances have more recently been made
in computer understanding and generation of speech. Although to what extent
currently available speech processing systems are intelligent is a debatable issue,
they (like chess playing programs) have become part of modern life:
We may hope that machines will eventually compete with men in all purely
intellectual fields. But which are the best ones to start with? Even this is a dif-
ficult question. Many people think that a very abstract activity, like the playing
of chess, would be best. It can also be maintained that it is best to provide the
machine with the best sense organs that money can buy, and then teach it to
understand and speak English.
. . .
Again, I do not know what the right answer is, but I think both approaches
should be tried (Turing, 1950, p. 460).
Take a look at computer technology at the turn of the century: What was un-
imaginable in 1950, in terms of memory and speed, is now reality. What Turing
predicted about the IG, however, is still a challenge.
I believe that in about fifty years’ time, it will be possible to programme com-
puters with a storage capacity of about 109, to make them play the imitation
game so well that an average interrogator will not have more than 70 per-
cent chance of making the right identification after five minutes of questioning
(Turing, 1950, p. 442).
3. From the Imitation Game to the Turing Test: The 60’s and the 70’s
Earlier remarks on the TT, with the exception of Colby et al. (1971), Colby et
al. (1972) and Weizenbaum (1966), were mostly of the phllosophical sort. This is
hardly surprising because ‘Computing Machinery and Intelligence’ was published
in a philosophy journal,Mind.9 Many discussions on the IG were published in
the 60’s and the 70’s, many of the important contributions once again accommo-
dated byMind. In this section we will take a look at these philosophical papers,
leaving the more practical work described in Colby et al. (1971), Colby et al.
(1972), Weizenbaum (1966) to other, more appropriate sections. Readers interested
in earlier comments on the TT and machine intelligence that are not discussed in
this section can consult Pinksy (1951), Mays (1952) and Reader (1969).
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Keith Gunderson’s comments on the IG are summarized in Section 3.1. Section
3.2 presents an approach stating that developing a TT-passing program is not going
to be possible in the foreseeable future. The anthropomorphism in the TT is briefly
discussed in Section 3.3, to be taken up later on. An inductive interpretation of the
TT is described in Section 3.4.
3.1. ROCKS THAT IMITATE AND ALL -PURPOSE VACUUM CLEANERS
One of the earlier comments on Turing’s IG came from Keith Gunderson in his
1964 Mind article. In this paper, titled ‘The Imitation Game’, Gunderson points
out some important issues pertaining to Turing’s replacement for the question "Can
machines think?".
Gunderson develops certain objections to Turing’s ‘Computing Machinery and
Intelligence’ (Turing, 1950) by focusing on the IG. He emphasizes two points:
First, he believes that playing the IG successfully is anend that can be achieved
through different means, in particular, without possessing intelligence. Secondly,
he holds that thinking is a general concept and playing the IG is butoneexample
of the things that intelligent entities do. Evidently, both claims are critical of the
validity of the IG as a measure of intelligence.
Gunderson makes his point by an entertaining analogy. He asks the question
"Can rocks imitate?" and proceeds to describe the "toe-stepping game" (Gunder-
son, 1964, p. 236) in a way that is identical to the way Turing described his IG in
Turing (1950). Once again, the game is played between a man (A), a woman (B),
and an interrogator (C). The interrogator’s aim is to distinguish between the man
and the woman by the way his/her toe is stepped on. C stays in a room apart from
the other two and cannot see or hear the toe-stepping counterparts. There is a small
opening in the wall through which C can place his/her foot. The interrogator has
to determine which one of the other two is the woman by the way in which his/her
toe is stepped on. Analogously, the new form of the question "Can rocks imitate?"
becomes the following: ‘What will happen when a rock box is constructed with
an electric eye which operates across the opening in the wall so that it releases
a rock which descends upon C’s toe whenever C puts his foot through A’s side
of the opening, and thus comes to take the part of A in this game?. . . Will the
interrogator decide wrongly as often as when the game is played between a man
and a woman?’ (Gunderson, 1964, pp. 236–237).
Gunderson believes that even if rock boxes play the toe-stepping game success-
fully, there would still be no reason to accept that they are imitating. The only
conclusion that we can make from this would be that a rock box can be rigged in
such a way that it can replace a human being in the toe-stepping game. According
to Gunderson, this is because ‘part of what things do is how they do it’ (Gunderson,
1964, p. 238). As we will expand upon in Section 4.1, this is similar to Ned Block’s
argument forpsychologismagainst behaviorism (Block, 1981).
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Gunderson states that thinking is not something that can be decided upon by
just one example. He demonstrates his belief that a computer’s success in the IG
is not sufficient reason to call it a thinking machine by another analogy: Imagine a
vacuum cleaner salesman trying to sell a product. First, he advertises the vacuum
cleanerSwish 600as being "all-purpose". Then, he demonstrates how it can suck
up bits of dust. The customer asks what else the machine can do. Astonished, the
salesman says that vacuum cleaners are for sucking up dust and that Swish 600
does precisely that. The customer answers, "I thought it was all-purpose. Doesn’t
it suck up bits of paper or straw or mud? I thought sucking up bits of dust was
an example of what it does". The salesman says "It is an example of what it does.
What it does is suck up pieces of dust" (Gunderson, 1964, p. 241).
The salesman has trouble making his sale by calling Swish 600 all-purpose
and being unable to show more than one example of what it does. According to
Gunderson, Turing also has the same problem because the term "thinking" is used
to refer to more than one capability, just as the term "all-purpose" implies that the
vacuum cleaner has functions other than just sucking up bits of dust. He concludes:
In the end the steam drill outlasted John Henry as a digger of railway tunnels,
but that didn’t prove the machine had muscles; it proved that muscles were not
needed for digging railway tunnels (Gunderson, 1964, p. 254).
John G. Stevenson, in his paper ‘On the Imitation Game’ (Stevenson, 1976)
raises some arguments against Gunderson. One of these is the objection that Gun-
derson was expecting, namely the claim that being able to play the IG is not just
oneexample; a machine that is good at the IG is capable of various things. Gun-
derson does not give a direct response to such objections. He mentions a reply
can be formulated along the lines of showing that even combining all those things
such a machine can do gives us a narrow range of abilities (Gunderson, 1964,
p. 243). Stevenson doubts whether such a reply would be adequate (Stevenson,
1976, p. 132). Even if it does not exhaust everything that is related to human
thinking, he believes the list of things that a computer that plays the IG can do
would be quite impressive. Stevenson states that Gunderson is ignoring the specific
character of the IG and that he proposes defective arguments.
3.2. THE TT AS SCIENCE FICTION
Richard Purtill, in his 1971Mind paper also discusses some issues concerning the
IG. Purtill criticizes some ideas in Turing’s paper ‘mainly as a philosopher, but also
as a person who has done a certain amount of computer programming’ (Purtill,
1971, p. 290). He believes that the game is interesting, but as a piece of science
fiction. He finds it unimaginable that a computer playing the IG will be built in the
foreseeable future.
Overall, Purtill believes the IG to be a computer man’s dream. He even promises
to ‘eat his computer library’ if anyone has a notion of the principles on which a
machine that can play the game is to be built (Purtill, 1971, p. 293). He states that
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if computers, some day, behave like the computers in works of science fiction, he
would grant them thought. But since all computer outputs can be explained as a
result of a program written by humans, even if the program’s outputs are guided by
certain random elements, computers are not likely to play the IG successfully with
the currently imaginable programming techniques. This, he believes, is because the
behavior of thinking beings is not deterministic and cannot be explained in purely
mechanistic terms.
Purtill believes that the game is ‘just a battle of wits between the questioner and
the programmer: the computer is non-essential’ (Purtill, 1971, p. 291). Although
the former part of the claim may be reasonable to an extent, his latter argument
about the computer being non-essential is not very sound. To eliminate the com-
puter from the picture, Purtill proposes "purely mechanical" alternatives: machines
made of levers and wheels that can do the same task. We think it is unclear why
this should count as an argument against the IG because, evidently, the material or
structure on which the IG-playing "program" works is irrelevant. Purtill also states,
anticipating the objection that the human mind might also be a highly complex
collection of such mechanical processes, that if this were the case, it would mean
‘human beings do not in fact think rather than that computers do think’ (Purtill,
1971, p. 292), but does not attempt to justify this bold claim.
In his short paper ‘In Defence of Turing’ (Sampson, 1973), Geoffrey Sampson
attacks Purtill’s arguments briefly. First of all, he believesmost of the limitations
pertaining to the realization of IG-playing computers which Purtill lists are prac-
tical difficulties that may be overcome in the (presumably not so distant) future.
Secondly, he states that it is only natural that computer behavior is deterministic
and that human behavior is not so easy to explain. The reasons for this are simple:
computers are designed by humans; they have mechanisms that explicitly allow
us to study their behavior; humans are much more complex in terms of both in-
ternal states and possible inputs than any contemporary computer (Sampson, 1973,
p. 593). Sampson also rejects Purtill’s opinion that the consequence of the claim
that human thinking is an extremely complex, yet computer-like, mechanical pro-
cess is that men do not think. He holds that thinking, by definition, is something
human beings do.
3.3. ANTHROPOMORPHISM AND THE TT
In a short paper that appeared inMind in 1973, P.H. Millar raises some important
issues which will show up in later works. He first discusses some vices and virtues
of the IG and states that it is irrelevant whether or how the computers or the human
beings involved in the game are "programmed". Then, he introduces the question
of whether the IG is a right setting to measure the intelligence of machines. Millar
notes that the game forces us to "anthropomorphize" machines by ascribing them
human aims and cultural backgrounds. Millar asserts that the IG measures not
whether machines have intelligence, but whether they haveumanintelligence.
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He believes that we should be open-minded enough to allow each being, be it a
Martian or a machine, to exhibit intelligence ‘by means of behavior which is well-
adapted for achieving its own specific aims’ (Millar, 1973, p. 597). We will return
to this issue later on, especially in Section 4.5.
3.4. THE TT INTERPRETED INDUCTIVELY
In his important paper ‘An Analysis of the Turing Test’ (Moor, 1976), James Moor
attempts to emphasize the significance of the imitation game. As can be seen from
the title, the term "Turing Test" was already being used to refer to the IG by 1976.
Moor’s main assertion is that ‘the Turing Test is a significant test for computer
thought if it is interpreted inductively’ (Moor, 1976, p. 256).
Moor disagrees with the idea that the TT is an operational definition of intelli-
gence.10 Rather, he proposes, it should be regarded as a source of inductive evid-
ence for the hypothesis that machines can think. Moreover, Moor does not agree
with the claim that even if the TT is not an operational definition, it should at least
be a necessary condition for granting computers intelligence. According to him,
there could be other evidence based on the computer’s behavior that leads to in-
ferences about the computer’s thinking abilities. However, he believes that the test
provides a sufficient condition for intelligence-granting to computers. But his view
is not "absolute"; he accepts that it is possible to revise a positive inference about
a computer’s possession of thought based on a TT, if other evidence is acquired
afterwards.
Moor lists two arguments that support the TT as a good format for collect-
ing inductive evidence. ‘First, the Turing Test permits direct or indirect testing
of virtually all of the activities one would count as evidence for thinking. . .
Secondly, the Turing Test encourages severe testing’ (Moor, 1976, pp. 251–252).
By the latter, Moor means the test’s requirements are not too easy to meet. For
instance, competence in a single cognitive activity, no matter how complex, would
not suffice.
Moor proceeds by considering some of the objections to the TT. He gives replies
to these objections and shows that they are either irrelevant or can be refuted
when the TT is considered to be a way of gathering data based on which we
may inductively infer conclusions about machine thought. One objection to which
Moor, in our opinion successfully, replies is the objection concerning internal oper-
ation. Theview that information about the internal information processing system
is important in granting it intelligence is not uncommon (Gunderson, 1964; Block
1981; Schweizer, 1998). Moor warns against the possible confusion between two
variants of this conception. There is an important difference between the claim
that evidence about the internal operation of a computermight alter a justified
inductive inference that the computer can think, and the claim that such evidence
is necessary to makesuch an inference. Moor believes the former and notes that
this is not a criticism that can be made of the TT. If certain kinds of information
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about the internal operation of a machine that was believed to possess intelligence
after being Turing Tested are acquired afterwards, then we might just revise our
decision. If the latter alternative were true, then the objection could be used against
the test. But, according to Moor, critics fail to show that this is true and they are
not likely to ever succeed.
As was discussed above within the context of Gunderson’s paper (Gunderson,
1964), the TT may be considered inadequate because it is onlyoneevaluation of
behavior. Moor answers this kind of objection also in a liberal light, in a man-
ner similar to his discussion outlined above. Once again he makes a distinction
between two claims: one positing that behavioral evidence which cannot be directly
obtained in the TTmight altera justified inductive inference that a computer can
think, and the other stating that such evidenceis necessary to makethis decision.
Moor believes that the former is true. Further testing, he says, would be valuable
and could even make us change our inference. The important point is that this does
not incapacitate the TT in any way. The test could be attacked on these premises
only if the latter claim were true. Moor believes the critics have not, and are not
going to be able to prove this. This is because he believes that the format provided
by the test enables examining a very large set of activities thatwould count as
evidence of thinking. Thereby, he refutes the objections about the scope of the
test.
Moor concludes by stating that although the TT has certain short-comings (e.g.,
it being of little value in guiding research), it is an important measure for computer
thought when it is inductively interpreted. Moreover, the standard criticisms of the
TT fail to show that it is deficient if such an interpretation is made.
A reply to Moor comes from Douglas F. Stalker (1978). He prefers to call
Moor’s interpretation an explanatory one rather than an inductive one. Stalker notes
that Moor’s beliefs about the mentality of other humans, as well as computers,
are part of an explanatory theory. He emphasizes that Moor does not justify that
his theory of explaining a computer’s success at the TT by using the concept of
thinking is thebesttheory that can be constructed about the same phenomenon.
As an alternative explanation for the computer’s behavior, Stalker proposes a
purely mechanistic theory that does not appeal to any mental concepts. His the-
ory takes into consideration such factors as the computer’s physical structure, its
program and its physical environment. Moreover, he believes this theory to be
preferable to Moor’s. Stalker believes explanatory theories that involve concepts of
thinking can apply to people, but because of some fundamental differences between
computers and humans, they may not be the best theories for explaining computer
behavior.
In his answer to Stalker, Moor (1978) argues that the existence of alternative
explanations does not mean that they would necessarily be competitors. It is true
that an explanation for a computer’s activities can be given at different levels: phys-
ics, electronic circuitry, programs, abstract automata, etc. Moor notes that these
explanations would be different, but not necessarily rivals. In the case of a com-
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puter displaying intelligent behavior by being successful in the IG, an explanatory
theory involving thinking could even be preferred because it is simpler and easier
to understand. Moor’s conclusion is:
It seems natural and probably most understandable to couch the explanation
in terms of a theory of mind. If one has the patience, the explanation could
also be given at lower levels of description, e.g., involving perhaps thousands
of computer instructions or millions of changes in circuit states (Moor, 1978,
p. 327).
4. In and Out of the Armchair: The 80’s and the 90’s
While thought experiments are still around, work on the TT in the 80’s and 90’s
often leaves the comfortable armchair of philosophy. In this section we will cover
only some of the works that have addressed the TT. This is mainly because of the
sheer abundance of material. The subset of the work done during the 80’s and
the 90’s that we present in this section will provide a general overview of the
main arguments, and the reader is directed to references for further explication.
A must-read is Douglas Hofstadter’s ‘Turing Test: A Coffee-House Conversation’
(Hofstadter, 1982) which is full of valuable and entertaining insights. Ajit Naray-
anan studies the intentional stance and the IG (Narayanan, 1996). For a discus-
sion of the frame problem in relation to the TT, the reader is referred to Crockett
(1994). Other references that can be explored are Halpern (1987), Rankin (1987),
Forsyth (1988), Guccione and Tamburrini (1988), Bieri (1988), Alper (1990), Dav-
idson (1990), Parsons (1990), Clark (1992), Sharma and Conrath (1993), Jacquette
(1993a), Marinoff (1995), Cowley and MacDorman (1995), Feigenbaum (1996)
and Hayes (1998). A number of articles on the TT have appeared in popular science
magazines too. Some of these are Guillen (1983), Dewdney (1992), Platt (1995),
Flood (1996) and Wallace (1997).
The TT scene began heating up at the beginning of the 80’s. Although the "con-
sciousness argument" and the "anti-behaviorist argument" had been voiced before,
they had not been really unsettling. But in the early 80’s, two strong counter-
arguments against the TT were formulated by John Searle and Ned Block. The
debate on Searle’s "Chinese Room" is in itself expansive enough to be the subject
of a whole paper of at least this size. We consider it briefly in Section 4.2 and
the interested reader should have no difficulty finding more information about the
topic. Block’s anti-behaviorist attack of the TT, on the other hand, has not been
expanded upon in as much detail, and it is the aim of Section 4.1 to elaborate on
his ideas.
Various attempts have been made to modify the TT to get better "tests" for
machine thought, and these are discussed in Section 4.4. Robert French’s ‘Subcog-
nition and the Limits of the Turing Test’ (French, 1990) is examined in Section 4.5.
Finally, the "less philosophical" stance towards the TT is discussed in Section 4.6.
480 AYSE PINAR SAYGIN ET AL.
4.1. BEHAVIORISM AND NED BLOCK
In ‘Psychologism and Behaviorism’ (Block, 1981), Ned Block attacks the TT as
a behaviorist approach to intelligence. Although this paper was written in 1981,
Block still seems to hold the same opinions (Block, 1995).
Block believes that the judges in the TT can be fooled bymindlessmachines
that rely on some simple tricks to operate. He proposes a hypothetical machine
that will pass the TT, but has a very simple information processing component.
Block’s machine has all possible conversations of some given length recorded in its
memory. Of course, we want these conversations to be such that at least one party
is ‘making sense’; Block assumes that we have a non-question-begging definition
of ‘sensible’ (Block, 1995). The set of strings constituting such conversations that
can be carried out in a fixed amount of time are finite and thus can be enumerated
and stored in our hypothetical computer. The judge types in a string, sayA. The
machine finds a conversation beginning withA and types out the second sentence
of this string, sayB. If, next, the judge types inC, the process is repeated withA
replaced byABC. All the machine does is simple "lookup and writeout", certainly
nothing that anyone would call sophisticated information processing.
Since this machine has the intelligence of a jukebox (Block, 1995) or a toaster
(Block, 1981), and since it will pass the TT, the test must be an inadequate meas-
ure of intelligence. Block ties this conclusion to the more general one that this is
because of the behaviorist approach taken in the design of the TT.
Ned Block defines psychologism as ‘the doctrine that whether behavior is in-
telligent behavior depends on the character of the internal information processing
that produces it’ (Block, 1981, p. 5). According to this definition, two systems can
display the same actual and potential behavior, have the same behavioral properties,
capacities and dispositions, and yet, there could be a difference in their information
processing prompting us to grant one full intelligence while holding that the other
is devoid of any.
A classical argument against psychologism is the Martian argument: Suppose
that there is life on Mars. Humans and Martians meet, develop an understanding of
each other, engage in mental and creative activities together, and so on. And then,
it is discovered that Martians have significantly different information processing
mechanisms than those of humans. Would we, then, deny that these creatures have
intelligence just because they are very different from us? This would be, as Block
likes to call it, pure "chauvinism". He holds that psychologism does not involve
this kind of chauvinism. After all, psychologism does not state that the fact that a
system has a completely different information processing mechanism compared to
human beings necessarily means that it lacks intelligence.
Attacking the validity of the TT using psychologism does not seem to be Block’s
main interest. He is more concerned with arguing against behaviorism using the TT
as a focal point.
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As was mentioned above, Block believes, because of characteristics peculiar
to the design of the TT, some genuinely intelligent machines can be classified
as lacking intelligence and vice versa. Here is what Block suggests in order to
eliminate dependence on human discriminatory powers: ‘We should specify, in a
non-question-beggingway what it is for a sequence of responses to verbal stim-
uli to be a typical product of one or another style of intelligence’ (Block, 1981,
p. 10, emphasis added). Then, Block suggests we revise our intelligence-granting
mechanism as follows:
Intelligence (or more accurately, conversational intelligence) is the disposition
to produce a sensible sequence of verbal responses to a sequence of verbal
stimuli, whatever they may be (Block, 1981, p. 11).
Now, the modified TT does not depend on anyone’s coming up with good
questions, since the system must have adispositionto emit sensible responses to
anything that the interrogatormightsay, not just to the things that he/shedoessay.
At this point, Block demonstrates that the modified TT is not greatly affected by the
standard arguments against behaviorism.11 The minor defects of the modified TT
as a behavioral conception of intelligence can be protected against these arguments
with another modification. The reformulation involves thereplacement of the term
"disposition" by "capacity". The difference is that a capacity toφ need not result
in a disposition toφ, unless certaininternal conditions are met. Now, all arguments
against behaviorism are avoided12 with the neo-TT conception of intelligence:
Intelligence (or more accurately, conversational intelligence) is the capacity to
produce a sensible sequence of verbal responses to a sequence of verbal stimuli,
whatever they may be (Block, 1981, p. 18).
Although Block seems to be ‘helping out’ the TT by making it less prone to anti-
behaviorist objections, this is hardly a surprising consequence when the definition
of intelligence is modified into something that is not really behaviorist any more.
Block seems to be aware of this for he says the concession made to psychologism
by moving from behavioral dispositions to behavioral capacities will not be enough
to save behaviorism (Block, 1981, p. 18). His strategy is stretching behaviorism
to its limits and showing that, even if we have the most general form of it, the
behaviorist conception of intelligence is false.
How, one may wonder, will he do that? Block describes a machine that can
produce a sensible sequence of verbal responses to verbal stimuli and is intelligent
according to the neo-TT conception of intelligence. However, according to him,
the information processing of the machine clearly demonstrates that it is devoid of
intelligence. We have explained how this machine works in the introductory para-
graphs of this section. This machine will have the capacity to emit sensible verbal
output to any verbal input, and therefore would qualify as intelligent according to
the neo-TT conception of intelligence. But the machine, in fact ‘has the intelligence
of a toaster’ (Block, 1981, p. 21). This is primarily due to the fact that all the
intelligence it exhibits belongs to the programmers, not to the machine itself. Block
therefore concludes that the neo-TT conception of intelligence is insufficient.
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It can be argued that, by Block’s reasoning,any intelligent machine exhibits
the intelligence of its programmers. Block says he is making no such claim. A
machine that has more sophisticated mechanisms such as learning and problem
solving would, to Block, be intelligent. In the latter case, the intelligence exhibited
belongs to the machine itself (Block, 1981, p. 25). The search machine of Block can
only respond with what has already been put in its memory by the programmers.13
Block argues that ‘the neo-Turing Test conception of intelligence does not allow
us to distinguish between behavior that reflects a machine’s own intelligence and
behavior that reflectsonly the intelligence of the machine’s programmers. (Block,
1981, p. 25, emphasis original). This kind of argument has been considered by
Turing, as described briefly in Section 2.2.
Another objection is as follows: Block is merely suggesting a new definition
of intelligence by stipulating certain internal conditions. Block defends the new
definition here, which is presuppositive of its existence! Therefore, Block is in-
directly admitting that all he is doing is suggesting that we adopt new criteria for
intelligence and dispose of the behaviorist ones (Block, 1981, p. 27).
Block also considers the "chauvinism" argument. A system with information
processing capabilities unlike ours may not be "intelligent" according to our cri-
teria; but then,wemight not count as "shmintelligent" according to their criteria.
‘And who is to say that intelligence is any better than shmintelligence?’ (Block,
1981, p. 27). Block denies the chauvinism attributed to him. He believes ‘[his]
machine lacks the kind of "richness" of information processing requisite for intel-
ligence’ (Block, 1981, p. 28). He does not feel the need to elaborate on what sort
of systems have the abovementioned richness believing that ‘one can refute the
Turing Test conception by counterexample without having to say very much about
what intelligence really is’ (Block, 1981, p. 28).
To those who ask what Block would think if it turned out that humans process
information in the way that Block’s machine does, Block responds as follows:
If the word "intelligence" is firmly anchored to human information processing,
as suggested above, then my position is committed to theempirical claim
that human information processing is not like that of my machine. But it is
a perfectly congenial claim, one that is supported by both common sense and
by empirical research in cognitive psychology (Block, 1981, p. 29, emphasis
original).
It can be argued that Block’s machine is unrealizable because of combinatorial
explosion. We will not go into the details of this; Block’s response to this objection
can be found in Block (1981, pp. 30–34).
Richardson, in reply to Block (Richardson, 1982), is doubtful whether Block’s
machine can really imitate human conversational abilities. Humans can (and do)
understand sentences that they never heard/uttered before and produce sentences
that they never heard/uttered before. They can do this in such a way that they
can adapt to novel situations and maintain the coherence of discourse. The brain
cannot be a repertoire of responsesand must contain a program that can build an
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unlimited set of sentences out of a finite list of words.14 If the potentially utter-
able/understandable and sensible sentences that a human mind can produce in a
lifetime is unlimited, then how can a team of humans gather this information and
enter it in the memory of the machine in finite amount of time? It is difficult to
imagine Block’s machine managing the many intricacies of human conversation
such as adapting to topic shifts and contextual changes. Richardson believes ‘if the
list-searcher satisfies the neo-Turing Test,the test is too weak’ (Richardson, 1982,
p. 423). For Block’s response to such arguments see Block (1981, pp. 35–36).
Block must have realized some difficulties in enumerating the strings as well.
He later introduces the Aunt Bubbles machine15 in Block (1995). In this version,
the programmers think ofjust oneresponse to the strings at each step. To maintain
coherence and make the task easier to follow, they may choose to simulate a definite
person, for instance Block’s own (most probably hypothetical) Aunt Bubbles. They
may even restrict the situation by modeling Bubbles’ responses in the case that she
is brought into the teletype room by her ‘strange nephew’ (Block, 1995). So each
response is the kind of response that Aunt Bubbles would give to the verbal inputs.
Block says that the machine will do as well as Aunt Bubbles herself in a TT, but it
is obviously not intelligent because of the reasons described above.
Let us briefly go over some of Block’s arguments and the behaviorism in the
TT before we proceed. For one thing, as Block also mentions, the intelligence
concept (because of some inherent properties it has) does not fully conform to the
generalizations of behaviorist or anti-behaviorist arguments based on other mental
states such as pain (Block, 1981, pp. 13–16). There is another aspect of intelligence
that can justify the behaviorist approach of the TT. Behaviorism may be considered
an antiquated or primitive approach in general, but it does not seem that awkward
to use it in intelligence-granting. This is primarily because we grant intelligence
that way: Upon seeing a human being we automatically assume that he/she is
intelligent. We feel free to approach a person (rather than, say, a dog or a lamp
post) to ask the whereabouts of the post office without having many doubts about
him/her understanding us. If the TT is that crude and unsophisticated, then we,
as humans might consider revising our intelligence-granting mechanisms as well.
This constitutes a line of defense for the TT: if behavioral evidence is acceptable
for granting intelligence to humans, this should be the casefor machines as well.
We have discussed this already in Section 2.2.
Recall that Block believes humans can be overly chauvinistic or liberal in grant-
ing intelligence to machines. However, it is unclear how he classifies genuinely
intelligent machines and mindless machines. Ifthere is a way of deciding on that
issue, anX-Test to determine whether a machine is really intelligent, then why
would we be discussing the TT with all its quirks and imperfections? In addition,
although he does nottrust the human judges in the beginning, later on Block seems
to have complete faith in the ‘imagination and judgmentof a very large and clever
team working for a long time with a very large grant and a lot of mechanical help’
(Block, 1981, p. 20, emphasis original).
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With the current research on cognition and linguistics at hand, it seems unlikely
that an approach like Block’s can succeed in modeling the human mind. If one day,
enough on language and cognition is discovered so that Block’s ‘sensible’ strings
of sentences are enumerated then we may decide that the neo-TT conception of
intelligence is false. But then again, when that day comes, having all thepsycho-
logistic information we need, we probably would not be interested in the TT any
more.
In any case, Block’s paper is significant because it demonstrates the weakness
of the behavioral approach in the TT. The TT may be abandoned one day, because
more information on how the mind works may be obtained and we may have better
means to detect another entity’s cognitive capacities. But today, we do not have
much to look at that is more informative than behavior.
4.2. THE CHINESE ROOM
In the beginning of the 80’s, with John Searle’s Chinese Room argument (Searle,
1980), the TT was confronted with yet another objection. The analysis of the
Chinese Room can easily get out of hand since a great number of comments have
been made on the issue and the debate still rages on.
In a nutshell, here is what the Chinese Room looks like: Suppose that Searle,
a native speaker of English who does not know a word of Chinese, is locked in
a room. There is an opening in the room through which we may send in Chinese
sentences on pieces of paper. Of course, these look like meaningless squiggles to
Searle (Searle, 1980). In the room, Searle has a "Chinese Turing Test Crib Book"
(Leiber, 1992) he can consult to find an output that corresponds to each Chinese
symbol he receives. What he does is simply match the input with those in the book,
follow some rules written in English and find some Chinese symbol sequence to
output. We correspond with Searle in this manner and due to the flawless look-
up table he has, Searle-in-the-room seems to understand Chinese perfectly. But
he does not. Searle still has no idea about what the Chinese symbols we send in
and those that he sends out mean. To him, "Squiggle-Squiggle" is coming in and
"Squoggle-Squoggle" is going out (Harnad, 1991).
Now consider a computer program that passes the TT in Chinese. Proponents
of the TT will grant that this computer thinks and, in some sense, understands
Chinese symbols. Searle challenges this by being the computer and yelling at the
world that he does not understand a word of Chinese. Judging by the inputs and
outputs of the system, Searle-in-the-room is indistinguishable from a native speaker
of Chinese. In a sense, he is passing the TT in Chinese, without understanding a
word of Chinese. It should be clear how that constitutes a criticism of the TT, and
the computational view of mind.
As was mentioned before, various aspects of the Chinese Room argument have
been analyzed including syntax/semantics, consciousness, boundaries of systems,
etc. The interested reader is referred to Searle (1980, 1990), Harnad (1989), Ander-
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son (1987), Dyer (1990), Cole (1991), Copeland (1993), Rey (1986), Fodor (1991),
Hauser (1997), Boden (1988), Maloney (1987), Roberts (1990), Hayes et al. (1992)
and the references provided in those.
4.3. CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE TT
Another difficult and widely discussed problem in philosophy of mind is con-
sciousness. While we do not want to delve too far into this, we will take a brief
look at the relationship between consciousness and the TT.
Donald Michie’s ‘Turing’s Test and Conscious Thought’ (Michie, 1996) is one
of the important comments made on the TT. Michie discusses a variety of issues
surrounding the TT, but in this section we mainly concentrate on the conclusions
he draws about consciousness.
First of all, Michie notes that Turing did not specify whether consciousness
is to be assumed if a machine passes the TT. Of course, Turing probably did
not believe that consciousness and thought are unrelated. Rather, Michie thinks
he means ‘these mysteries and confusions do not have to be resolved before we
can address questions of intelligence’ (Michie, 1996, p. 31, see also Turing (1950,
p. 447) and Section 2.2). There seems to be a relationship between consciousness
and thinking. Some critics believe that intelligence cannot be granted to entities that
are not conscious (see, for instance Searle (1990) while others have questioned the
interdependence of conscious and subconscious processes (see, for instance French
(1990) and Section 4.5).
According to Michie, that the TT provides access to cognitive processes via
verbal communication incapacitates it as a test of intelligence. He observes two
dimensions in which this inadequacy manifests itself.
The first is ‘the inability of the test to bring into the game thought processes of
kinds which humans perform but cannot articulate’ (Michie, 1996, p. 36). Michie
gives examples of some operations humans can perform almost unconsciously. For
instance, any English speaker would be able to answer the question "How do you
pronounce the plurals of the imaginary English words ‘platch’, ‘snorp’ and ‘brell’
?" with "I would pronounce them as ‘platchez’, ‘snorpss’ and ‘brellz’." (Michie,
1996, p. 38). It is conceivable that the programmers of TT-passing programs will
be forearmed against this particular question, but it is unlikely that they can encode
all we know about pronunciation (or phenomena from non-linguistic domains, for
that matter) simply because some related processes operate at the subconscious
level. For a similar argument, the reader is referred to French (1990) and Section
4.5.
The second dimension in which Michie believes the TT to be mismatched
against its task is the phenomenon of machine ‘superarticulacy’. Namely, ‘the test
can catch in its net thought processes which the machine agentcanarticulate, but
should not if it is to simulate a human’ (Michie, 1996, p. 42). As was mentioned
above, humans perform many activities without being fully aware of how they
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do them. In fact, it has been shown that the better you get at something the less
aware of the underlying processes you become. Thus during a TT, ‘the interrogator
need only stray into some specialism in which both human and machine candidates
possess a given expertise’ (Michie, 1994, p. 192). The machine will give itself away
because of its superarticulacy. For more about superarticulacy, the reader is referred
to Michie (1996, pp. 41–43) and Michie (1990).
Finally, Michie notes the importance of social intelligence. AI should, he says,
try to incorporate emotional (also called affective) aspects of communication and
thought in the models developed. Michie also proposes, like some of those we will
see in the next section, that extensions to the TT can be made in order to ‘address
yet more subtle forms of intelligence, such as those involved in collective prob-
lem solving by co-operating agents, and in teacher-pupil relations’ (Michie, 1996,
p. 51).
We will cut the discussion of consciousness short both because it is a rather
broad topic, but also because most commentors on the TT (consciously or subcon-
sciously) propose arguments that can be interpreted from that angle. Can we not
reformulate the other minds problem ("How do I know that any entity other than
me has a mind?") in terms of consciousness ("How do I know that any entity other
than me is conscious?")? The reader can refer to Section 2.2 and Turing (1950,
pp. 445–447) for Turing’s answer to the argument from consciousness and how he
makes use of the other minds problem. Similarly, most questions about machine
thought can be re-evaluated within the context of machine consciousness. We in-
cluded the analysis of Michie’s paper here because it proposes new ideas from the
viewpoint of consciousness and relates them explicitly to the TT. Interested readers
can consult Dennett (1992), Gunderson (1967), Michie (1994), Michie (1995) for
more on consciousness.
4.4. ALTERNATIVE VERSIONS OF THE TT AND THEIR REPERCUSSIONS
In this section, we summarize some alternatives to the TT that have been proposed
in order to assess machine intelligence.
4.4.1. Harnad and the TTT
Stevan Harnad’s main contribution to the TT debate has been the proposal of the
Total Turing Test (TTT), which is, like the TT, an indistinguishability test but one
that requires the machines to respond to all of our inputs rather than just verbal
ones. Evidently the candidate machine for the TTT is a robot with sensorimotor
capabilities (Harnad, 1989, 1991).
Harnad’s motivation for the ‘robotic upgrade of the TT to the TTT’ (Harnad,
1991) has its roots in what he calls ‘the symbol grounding problem’. He likens the
situation of symbols being defined in terms of other symbols to a merry-go-round
in a Chinese-to-Chinese dictionary (Harnad, 1990). He claims that for there to be
any semantics in the mind (and there surely is) symbols must begrounded. Harnad
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deduces that meanings of symbols are, at least in part, derived from interactions
with the outside world.
Harnad does not explicitly argue that the TT is too specific (unlike Gunderson,
see Section 3.1). He concedes that language might capture the full expressive power
of our behavior, at least when the concern is assigning minds. What he doubts
is whether language is an ‘independent module’ (Harnad, 1989). His position is
summed up in the following:
Successfully passing the teletype version of the Turing Test alone may be
enough to convince us that the candidate has a mind just as written correspond-
ence with a never-seen penpal would, but full robotic capacities even if only
latent ones not directly exhibited or tested in the TT may still be necessary
to generate that successful linguistic performance in the first place. (Harnad,
1991, p. 46).
Harnad also defends his TTT against the Chinese Room argument which, in
our opinion, is uncalled for. The motivation of the TTT is quite clear; Harnad’s
assertions, although not undebatable, are understandable. An approval from Searle
would not make that much of a difference, but Harnad seems to think it is import-
ant. In any case, by doing so, he enables others to criticize his work on Searlean
accounts (Hauser, 1993; Bringsjord, 1994).
Larry Hauser, in his reply to Harnad’s ‘Other Bodies, Other Minds’ (Harnad,
1991), criticizes Harnad and Searle and aims to show that ‘Harnad’s proposed
robotic upgrade of the TT to the TTT is unwarranted’ (Hauser, 1993, p. 234).
To that end, he analyzes Harnad’s intuitive, scientific and philosophical reasons
for proposing the upgradeand argues against them. Hauser considers the TTT to
be unnecessary because, he notes, if the sensorimotor capacities the TTT tests for
are necessary for the linguistic capacities that the TT tests for, exhibiting the latter
should besufficientfor inferring the former (Hauser, 1993, p. 227).
For more on symbol grounding and the TTT, the reader is referred to Harnad’s
other papers (Harnad, 1992, 1994, 1998). Also interesting is James H. Fetzer’s ‘The
TTT is not the Final Word’ (Fetzer, 1993), in which he aims to show that the TTT
cannot provide a proof for machine thought since more than symbol manipulation
androbotic capacity should be involved in intelligence-granting.
In addition to the TTT, Harnad also mentions a TTTT (Total Total Turing Test)
which requires neuromolecular indistinguishability. However, this more stringent
version of the TT, according to Harnad, will be unnecessary. Once we know about
how to make a robot that can pass the TTT, he says, we will have solved all the
problems pertaining to mind-modeling. However, neural data might be used as
clues about how to pass the TTT (Harnad, 1991). Harnad believes ‘[TTTT] is as
much as a scientist can ask, for the empirical story ends there’ (Harnad, 1998), but
he does not think that we have to "go that far". The reader is referred to Harnad
(1998) for a detailed explanation of why Harnad believes the TTT is enough. For
an excellent third person account of the TT/TTT/TTTT story, among other issues,
the reader is referred to Fetzer (1995).
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4.4.2. The Argument from Serendipity and the Kugel Test
Stringent versions of the TT are also mentioned by Selmer Bringsjord. Bringsjord
supposes that there is a sequence of TT variants in increasing order of stringency.
In his "What Robots Can and Can’t Be" (Bringsjord, 1992) he aims to show that
AI will produce machines that will pass these stronger versions, but the attempt to
build an artificial person will still fail.
Bringsjord is one of those who wants to remain within "the philosophical ter-
rain". In Bringsjord (1994), he developsthe argument from serendipityagainst the
TT and defends this against some criticisms.
The argument from serendipity, as the name suggests, refutes the TT by a finite
state automaton (FSA) that generates random English sentences. Call this auto-
matonP. During a TT,P may just get lucky and fool the interrogator. So much
for the TT! Even the TTT can be refuted similarly. A robot may behave randomly
and by chance, its linguistic behavior may coalesce with the sensorimotor behavior
perfectly during a TTT.
Bringsjord finds the TTTT very chauvinistic and considers an alternative ver-
sion of it he calls TTTT∗. This latter test requires a flowchart match between the
brains of players A and B rather than a neuromolecular match (Bringsjord, 1994,
p. 104). But Bringsjord believes that the TTTT∗ is an ‘impracticable nightmare’
since we would not know how to conduct this test. The interested reader should
consult Bringsjord (1994) to see Bringsjord explain his reasoning where he appeals
both to intuition and computability theory.
Bringsjord, determined to attack every version of the TT, also "refutes" the
Kugel Test (KT). The KT is not as well known as the TTT or the other versions
of the TT that we investigated in this section. Once again, there are three players
involved. A judge, who sits behind two bins markedYESandNO runs the game.
The aim of the participants is to guess the concept that the judge thinks up by
looking at the cards (with pictures on them) that the judge drops in the two bins. A
card goes to theYESbin if it falls under the concept, and to theNO bin otherwise.
To give an example, if the concept that the judge is thinking of is "woman", cards
with pictures of women (or conceivably, items typically identified with women)
go to theYESbin. A player need not announce the concept when he/she finds it.
He/shewinsthe round if there comes a time at which all future guesses about which
bin a card will be placed in are correct (Kugel, 1990, p. 4). Thus the player must
not only identify the concept (e.g., not just say "Aha! The concept iswoman”) but
should also be able to apply it. Now, just as in the TT, to pass the KT, a machine
has to perform as well as a human. An interesting twist here is that the machine
must be able to win the game, which is not the same as winning a round. A game
consists of infinitely many rounds.
Why, it may be asked, would anyone design such an obscure test? Kugel, by
requiring the machine to win infinitely many rounds, wants to rule out the possibil-
ity of an FSA passing the KT (Kugel, 1986, 1990). Although the test is practically
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useless (because it requires infinite amount of time), is it of any theoretical signi-
ficance? Kugel believes that humans are neither pigheaded (i.e., once they think of
an answer to the "sequence game" they do not have to stick with it) nor narrow-
minded (i.e., once they find thenth member of a sequence, they are still able to
learn a different sequence with the same initial elements). If humans were Turing
machines (or FSA’s with lesser powers) they would be pigheaded and narrow-
minded. Kugel holds that humans are automata of some sort, and in the light of
the above concludes that they must be trial-and-error machines. For more on the
KT, the reader is referred to Kugel (1986, 1990) and Bringsjord (1994).
Bringsjord is interested in the KT primarily because it rules out FSA’s from
passing it. He notes that Kugel’s arguments may be unsound, but assuming they are
not, he asks the question "Do we have in KT an acceptable variant of the original
TT?" (Bringsjord, 1994, p. 115). Bringsjord’s answer is negative. The KT is rigid
and does not allow access to all cognitive capacities that the TT does. We agree
with this criticism of Bringsjord; participants in the KT are rather passive and their
innovative (or rather, generative) capabilities cannot be tested. Bringsjord’s second
argument against the KT is again from serendipity. A trial-and-error machine can
call the random string generating FSAP mentioned above for the declarations
about what the concept in question is, and so much for the KT... Once again, the
reader can consult Bringsjord (1994) to see how the argument from serendipity is
"guaranteed to work" against the TT and its variants.
4.4.3. The Inverted Turing Test
Recently, Stuart Watt has proposed the Inverted Turing Test (ITT) (Watt, 1996).
Watt’s point is that the TT is inseparable from "naive psychology"17 since to pass
the TT, a machine has to convince the interrogator that it has a mind. He calls naive
psychology ‘the psychological solution to the philosophical problem’ (Watt, 1996),
the latter being the other minds problem.
Watt’s ITT requires the machine to be able to prove its humanness by exercising
naive psychology. In particular, it has to show that its power of discrimination is
indistinguishable from that of a human judge in the TT. The TT is literally inverted
and ‘a system passes [the ITT] if it is itself unable to distinguish between two
humans, or between a human and a machine that can pass the normal TT, but
which can discriminate between a human and a machine that can be told apart by
a normal TT with a human observer’ (Watt, 1996).
Watt states that he proposes the ITT as a thought experiment rather than as a
goal for AI. Incidentally, he believes that the same applies to the TT and both tests
should be regarded as means to gather inductive evidence on which inferences
about machine mentality can be made (Moor, 1976). We have discussed this earlier
in Section 3.4.
Watt may be right about intelligence being in the eye (or the mind) of the
beholder; many people have noted the human disposition to ascribe intelligence
to systems that are not and vice versa. But the new test he proposes, the so-called
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ITT, has been subject to some strong counter-arguments as we shall shortly see. It
can be said that Watt’s motivation for introducing the ITT seems reasonable, but
the proposal itself is problematic.18
Selmer Bringsjord and Robert French reply to Watt (Bringsjord, 1996; French,
1996) by proposing simple methods that reveal some weaknesses of the ITT. The
titles of the papers are illustrative of their content. Bringsjord’s ‘The Inverted Tur-
ing Test is Provably Redundant’ (Bringsjord, 1996) shows that the ITT is entailed
by the original TT. Bringsjord also opposes Watt’s motivation and believes that
naive psychology is withering in many humans (including himself) and, with the
advent of computer programs that are very difficult to distinguish from humans in
written communication, will soon be no more.
In ‘The Inverted Turing Test: A Simple (Mindless) Program that Could Pass It’
(French, 1996), Robert French shows both that the ITT can be simulated by the
TT (in a way that is very similar to Bringsjord’s) and that a very simple program
can readily be designed to pass the ITT. The mindless machine that will pass the
ITT is designed using ‘subcognitive questions’ that are described in French (1990,
1995). It is assumed that the conclusions explained by French in these works are
accepted. These are analyzed in substantial detail in Section 4.5. First, a large
set of subcognitive questions are selected, humans are surveyed, and a ‘Human
Subcognitive Profile’ for this ‘Subcognitive Question List’ is obtained. Now, if we
give these and a statistical analyzer to an interrogator (man or machine), he/she/it
should have no difficulty discriminating machines from humans. It is not difficult
to store the list and the profile in the memory and provide the computer with a small
statistics routine, and so much for the ITT. While the TT stumbles in the face of
subcognitive questions (see Section 4.5), they can be used to construct a mindless
machine that can pass the ITT.
Others have used their replies to Watt as opportunities to voice their opinions
about AI and the Turing Test in general. As we shall see in Section 4.6 Patrick
Hayes and Kenneth Ford view the TT as a harmful burden on AI. In their ‘The
Turing Test is Just as Bad When Inverted’ (Ford and Hayes, 1996), they state that
the ITT suffers from the same problems as the TT that they explicate in Hayes and
Ford (1995). They grant that Watt has a point in his arguments on naive psychology
but note that Turing’s original IG (the gender-based TT) is immune to most of
those since in this scenario, the interrogator will not be thinking about differences
between humans and machines. In any case, they believe that ‘it is time for AI
to consciously reject the naive anthropomorphism implicit in all such "imitation
games" and adopt a more mature description of its aims’ (Ford and Hayes, 1996).
Similarly, Collins, in his reply to Watt (Collins, 1997), does not really focus on
the ITT, but proposes a new variant of the TT. He believes that ‘the deep problem
of AI’ is that of trying to develop machines that can learn from their surroundings
the way humans do. There is currently an ‘interpretive asymmetry’ between the
way humans and computers do things. Machines are not as adaptive as humans in
human-computer interactions. According to Collins, this asymmetry will disappear
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when computers reach a level of sophistication in resolving mistakes and learning
from their surroundings that is comparable to that of humans and all the problems
of AI will be solved. Learning languages would then be one of the surface trans-
formations of this deep problem (Collins, 1990) and when this is solved ‘the rest
will be research and development’ (Collins, 1997).
To determine whether the interpretive asymmetry has disappeared, Collins be-
lieves we can use Turing-like tests. In fact he states that a sub-TT is enough to
assess whether this goal has been reached or not; complicating the matter by pro-
posing the ITT or the TTT is uncalled for. In the Editing Test (ET) that Collins
proposes, the task is no longer as comprehensive as holding a conversation, but that
of sub-editing previously-unseen passages of incorrect English. The interrogator
will try to come up with pieces of text that a linguistically competent human can
easily sub-edit and if a computer is indistinguishable from humans in this task, then
the ET is passed and the deep problem of AI is solved. Collins finishes by briefly
demonstrating that even the ET is very difficult to pass, at least with the currently
imaginable techniques such as a look-up table (Collins, 1997).
4.4.4. The Truly Total Turing Test
Very recently, in hisMinds and Machinespaper (Schweizer, 1998), Paul Schweizer
has proposed the ‘Truly Total Turing Test’ (TRTTT)19 He believes even Harnad’s
TTT to be an insufficient test for intelligence. Before he proposes the TRTTT,
Schweizer states his own opinions about the adequacy of behavioral criteria. He
views such tests as ‘dealing with evidence for intelligence but not as constitutive
or definitional’ (Schweizer, 1998, p. 264).
Schweizer, while talking about the other minds problem, notes that we usually
grant intelligence to other humans on behavioral bases because we have general
knowledge about the type of creature under consideration. However, in the TT, we
encounter a type about which we do not know anything. In the case of machines
we lack a "history" to base our decisions upon.
Schweizer believes that the TT, and even Harnad’s TTT, is subject to the "toy-
world" criticism. The systems that succeed in these tests would, according to him,
not be displaying an intelligence comparable to the natural intelligence of liv-
ing things that function in the real world. They can function only in constrained,
artificial worlds.
The TRTTT posits a long-term, evolutionary criterion: Consider cognitivetyp s
andtokensof those types. Although we do not have a theory of the intelligence of
the human cognitive type, we have an extensivehistorical recordof it (Schweizer,
1998, p. 267). This is precisely why behavioral intelligence-granting is acceptable
for individual humans (tokens of the type "human"). Thus robots, as a cognitive
type, should accomplish achievements that are comparable to those of humans. It is
no longer enough to converse in natural language or to play chess; robots as a ‘race’
must be able todeveloplanguages andinvent the game of chess. Similar (evolu-
tionary) tests have been proposed by others before but never so convincingly.20
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Schweizer makes very good use of the other minds problem to support the cultural
and cognitive evolution criteria that the TRTTT stipulates.
Now, after thetypepasses the TRTTT, we can evaluatetokensof the type by less
stringent behavioral tests, like the TTT and the TT. According to Schweizer, ‘imit-
ative tests like the TTT and the TT apply to individualsonly under the assumption
that the general type is capable of passing the [TRTTT]’ (Schweizer, 1998, p. 268,
emphasis original).
4.5. SUBCOGNITION AND ROBERT FRENCH
One of the more recent discussions about the TT can be found in Robert French’s
1990 article ‘Subcognition and the Limits of the Turing Test’ (French, 1990). In
this work, French aims to show that ‘the Turing Test provides a guarantee not of
intelligence, but of culturally-oriented intelligence’ (French, 1990, p. 54).
French considers two of Turing’s claims. The first is the claim that if a computer
passes the TT, it will necessarily be intelligent. The second is the claim that it will
be possible to build such a machine in the near future. These, he calls the philo-
sophical claim and the pragmatic claim respectively. French agrees with the former
claim. However, he believes that the pragmatic claim has been largely overlooked
in discussions of the TT. In ‘Subcognition and the Limits of the Turing Test’, he
is primarily concerned with this latter claim and believes that the TT is ‘virtually
useless’ (French, 1990, p. 53) as a real test of intelligence because it will never be
passed.
To establish this result, French considers "subcognitive" questions, i.e., ques-
tions that reveal low-level cognitive structure.21 French argues that any sufficiently
broad set of questions for a TT will contain subcognitive questions, even if the
interrogators do not intend to ask them. The fact that the cognitive and subcognitive
levels are intertwined in such a way, in turn, shows that the TT is essentially a test
for human intelligence, and not for intelligence in general.
First, let us consider an interesting analogy French makes: The Seagull Test.
Consider a Nordic island on which the only flying animals known to the inhabitants
are seagulls. One day, two philosophers are discussing the essence of flying. One of
them proposes flying is moving in the air. The other objects by tossing a pebble and
stating that the pebble certainly is not flying. The first philosopher stipulates that
the object remain aloft for a period of time for the activity to count as flying. But in
this case clouds, smoke, and children’s balloons qualify as flying entities, the other
argues. Then the first philosopher questions whether wings and feathers should be
involved but this is immediately refuted by the latter by pointing to penguins. While
the arguments continue to be inconclusive, they agree on a few facts: Theonly
flying objects known to them are the seagulls on their island. Flight has something
to do with being airborne; physical characteristics like feathers, beaks are probably
not involved. They, then, in the light of Turing’s famous article, devise a Seagull
Test for flight. They believe if something can pass the Seagull Test, it is certain that
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it is able to fly. Otherwise, no decision can be made; maybe it can fly, maybe it
cannot (French, 1990).
The Seagull Test works as follows: There are two three-dimensional radar
screens, one tracking a seagull and the other tracking the flying object attempt-
ing the test. The object will pass the test only if it is indistinguishable from the
seagull on the radar screen. The similarity between our TT and the Seagull Test is
evident. The arguments about the essence of flying between the two philosophers
are uncannily reminiscent of the arguments on the nature of intelligence. The test
itself is an almost direct analogue of the TT.
The Seagull test as it is cannot be passed by airplanes, helicopters, bats, beetles,
or sparrows. It is doubtful that anything can pass it. That is, except for the Nordic
seagulls of the philosophers’ island. Then, ‘what we have is not a test for flight at
all, but rather a test for flight as practiced by the Nordic Seagull’ (French, 1990,
p. 56). The analogy makes it clear what French thinks about the TT. Correspond-
ingly, he believes that the TT is a test for intelligence as practiced by a human
being.
Before proceeding with his main arguments about subcognitive questions,
French calls attention to several assumptions he is making. First, he allows the
interrogator to poll humans for the answers to some questions before asking them
during the test with the machine. Another assumption is that all the people involved
are from the same culture and the machine is attempting to imitate an individual
from that culture.22 And finally, French assumes that although building a machine
that can experience the world in a way indistinguishable from that of a human
being (from tasting strawberries to falling off bikes) is theoretically possible, this
is not likely to occur in the foreseeable future.
The first class of questions that French introduces are explicitly designed to
reveal low-level cognitive structure. These are based on research in cognitive psy-
chology, in particular, associative priming. For instance, it has been established that
if human subjects are presented with a set of words and non-words, they generally
require less time to recognize that a string is a word if it is preceded by a related
word, rather than a non-related one or a non-word. To give a specific example, the
item "salt" should be recognized faster when preceded by "pepper" and not by an
unrelated word like "shoe" or a non-word like "gloff".
Before questioning the computer, the interrogator runs a similar experiment on
a group of people23 and calculates average recognition times. During the test, the
interrogator can distinguish between the machine and the human simply by looking
at the recognition times on the same set of words on which the experiment had
been carried out. It is hard to imagine a machine being successful at deceiving the
interrogator in such a case. The only possible way to carry out associative priming
in a manner that is similar to the average human’s seems to be having experienced
life as an average human.
It may seem unfair to expect computers to match scientific, experimental data
about subcognitive capacities of the human mind. This view might even be ex-
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aggerated into expecting them to have a physical construction like ours. Whether
such an objection is valid or not, French proposes some questions that are (or rather
seem to be) at a higher cognitive level. The first kind is called the Neologism Rating
Game. The interviewees (and later the machine) will be given a set of made-up
words and will be asked to rank them on their appropriateness for defining certain
entities. Participants in the game are asked to rate, on a scale of 0 (completely
implausible) to 10 (completely plausible), whether a certain neologism can be a
name for something. French proposes a set of such questions that are especially
demonstrative. Here, we only consider two of those neologisms: "Flugblogs" and
"Flugly".
According to French, "Flugblogs" would make an inappropriate choice for the
name of a cereal since the initial syllable, "flug", is phonetically similar to "flub",
"thug", "ugly" and "ugh!" and the second syllable, "blogs" phonetically activates
"blob", "bog" etc. As can be seen, these words do not really sound very appetizing
and they each carry anaura of semantic connotations that renders them unsuit-
able choices as syllables of a cereal name. However, "Flugblogs" would be a very
appropriate name you would give to big, bulbous, air-filled bags used to walk on
water. In this case the semantic connotations of the syllables are in accordance with
the proposed meaning. Similar analysis of "Flugly", which activates friendship,
coziness, and cuteness, reveals that it is a plausible name for a child’s teddy bear.
The same name, although it has positive connotations, would sound awkward as
the surname of a glamorous movie star.
The arguments above are highly intuitive, and although most of us would agree
on them, we do not know precisely how we come up with the connotations. We do
know, however, that these happen due to a large number of culturally acquired as-
sociations. We do not have control over the accumulation of such associations; they
are pumped into our brains in daily life as brand names, advertising slogans, names
of pets and stereotypes of various sorts.24 Moreover, it is not possible to program
these into the computer since neologisms are virtually infinite in number. French
believes that the computer’s chances would be very low when the interviewees’
responses to such questions are compared to those of the human and the computer
in the IG.
Another game of a similar nature is the Category Rating Game in which the
questions are of the type "RateXs asYs", whereX andY are any two categories.
Again, French gives several illustrative examples (French, 1990, p. 61). Consider,
for instance, "Ratedry leavesashiding places". The definition of dry leaves does
not contain anything explicitly stating they might be good hiding places for chil-
dren, and yet ‘few among us would not make that association upon seeing the
juxtaposition of these two concepts’ (French, 1990, p. 60). If we are asked to rate,
on a scale of 0 to 10, most of us (those who have seen a James Bond movie at
some point in their lives) would certainly rate "pensasweapons" higher than, say,
"grand pianosaswheelbarrows". Again the answers to the Category Rating Game
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questions are highly dependent on our having experienced life as a human being in
a certain social and cultural setting.
Now that we have studied French’s subcognitive questions, let us see how he
uses these to refute the TT as a useful test for intelligence. The main claim is
that the physical level and the cognitive level of intelligence are inseparable. The
subcognitive questions reveal information about the low-level cognitive processes
of the entities answering them. In a way, if used during the TT, these would allow
the interrogator to ‘peek behind the screen’ (French, 1990, p. 62). These questions
allow comparison of the associative concept networks of the two candidates. And
because these networks are formed after a lifetime of experiencing the world and
the structure and nature of them are necessarily dependent on physical aspects of
that experience (like human sense organs, their locations in the body, etc.), the
computer will be distinguishable from the human. In short, it is not possible for a
computer (or any other non-human) to be successful in playing the IG. Not having
experienced the world as we have is not just an obstacle, but a severe restriction in
this task. This is due to the fact that the TT is a test for human intelligence, just as
the Seagull Test is a test for Nordic seagull flight.
French considers whether there can be a modification of the TT that does not
reduce the computers’ chances of passing it to zero. He explains the impossibility
of this as follows:
Surely, we would not want to limit a Turing Test to questions like "What is the
capital of France?" or "How many sides does a triangle have?". If we admit that
intelligence in general must havesomethingto do with categorization, analogy-
making, and so on, we will of course want to ask questions that test these
capacities. But these are the very questions that will allow us, unfailingly, to
unmask the computer (French, 1990, p. 63).
French repeatedly states, as was mentioned above, that the TT is a test for
humanintelligence. It may seem that by proposing subcognitive questions he is
stipulating that a human subcognitive substrate isnecessaryfor intelligence in
general, but this is only apparent. What Frenchreally attempts to demonstrate, as he
explains, is that the human subcognitive substrate is necessary to pass the TT (as
the subcognitive questions show), and that the TT is inadequate precisely because
of this. He holds that this substrate is definitely not necessary for intelligence in
general, just as being a Nordic seagull is not a necessary condition for flight.
French’s paper is significant in another sense: Instead of discussing whether
passing the TT is a sufficient or necessary condition for machine thought, he asks
whether the test can be passed at all. Let Searle have his room and Block his Aunt
Bubbles. French reminds us that the TT is difficult when you leave your armchair.
A criticism of French’s ‘Subcognition and the Limits of the Turing Test’ (French,
1990), has been made by Dale Jacquette in Jacquette (1993b). For French’s re-
sponse to Jacquette, the reader should refer to French (1995).
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4.6. GETTING REAL
As we mentioned in the beginning of this section, the more interdisciplinary ap-
proach that seems to prevail in the discussions of the mind has had effects on the
way we philosophize about the TT. Thus, the 90’s became a time during which it
was not so easy to get away with proposing wild thought experiments and leaning
back in your armchair to watch the fuss over them. Stevan Harnad expresses an
impatience that many were beginning to feel as follows:
If you want to talk about what a model or a simulation can or cannot do, first
get it to run. (Harnad, 1989, p. 4).
Recently, Justin Leiber has argued that the TT has been misinterpreted (Leiber,
1995). He notes that Block’s25 and Searle’s counter-arguments do not refute the TT.
Among the reasons Leiber lists for this are practical issues like memory, reliability
and speed. Leiber views the TT as an operational definition and states that ‘our
problem [is] one of engineering’ (Leiber, 1995, p. 65). His position is similar to
that stated by Harnad:
What you need to face Turing’s Turing Test is a reasonably detailed description
of a machine which can indeed be supposed to pass the Turing Test in real time
but which somehow is not really thinking (Leiber, 1995, p. 61).
At one extreme are Patrick Hayes and Kenneth Ford, who state that we should
reject the goal of passing the TT in their ‘Turing Test Considered Harmful’ (Hayes
and Ford, 1995). They believe that passing the TT is a distraction for "useful" AI
research.
Hayes and Ford believe that AI’s ultimate goal should not be that of imitating
human capabilities. Since the TT’s sole aim is precisely that, they believe that ‘it
is time to move it from textbooks to the history books’ (Hayes and Ford, 1995,
p. 972). They also see a problem with the gender issue in the IG:
The gender test is not a test of making an artificial human but of making a
mechanical transvestite (Hayes and Ford, 1995, p. 973).
[Turing] tells us quite clearly to try to make a program which can do as well as
a man at pretending to be a woman (Hayes and Ford, 1995, p. 977).
As we mentioned in Section 2.1, this peculiarity might have its reasons, but
Hayes and Ford have a moral objection concerned with the artificial constraints the
setting imposes on the participants of the game.
Hayes and Ford also express their inability to find a practical use for the TT.
Why on earth should we work that hard (and itis hard) to build a machine that im-
itates us? To depict the uselessness of direct imitation of humans in AI, they resort
to a very popular analogy: mankind’s futile attempts at making flying machines
by the imitation of natural flight. Artificial intelligence, like artificial flight, can
be radically different from natural flight. And it can still be a good thing. Hayes
and Ford believe that even if one’s goal is trying to understand humans, there is no
reason to define all that there is about cognition in terms of human cognition.
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Their belief that AI is a field that should strive to be useful leads Hayes and
Ford to deny passing the TT as a sensible goal. They hold that AI should produce
cognitive artifacts, not necessarily in a human way, but in a way useful to humans.
Blay Whitby, in ‘The Turing Test: AI’s Biggest Blind Alley?’ (Whitby, 1996),
makes similar arguments. He, like Hayes and Ford, believes that AI need not try
to imitate humans. He even uses the same analogy (i.e., AI and artificial flight).
Whitby states that the TT has become a distraction and he sees the main source as a
mistaken reading of ‘Computing Machinery and Intelligence’ (Turing, 1950). He is
of the opinion that ‘Turing’s paper [has been] interpreted as closer to an operational
test than he himself intended’ (Whitby, 1996, p. 54) and that ‘the last thing needed
by AI qua science is an operational definition of intelligence involving some sort
of comparison with human beings’ (Whitby, 1996, p. 62).
5. TT in the Social Sciences
A review of the TT would be incomplete if we were to consider the topic within
the boundaries of computer science and philosophy only. Turing’s ideas had many
repercussions in social sciences as well. The TT has naturally received attention
from sociologists. Much of the philosophical work on the topic also considers
social aspects of intelligence, but there have been researchers who concentrated
solely on this dimension. These sociological works are discussed in Section 5.1. In
addition, the gender issue in the TT has been analyzed and this will be summarized
in Section 5.2. Finally, Turing-like tests have been used toassess the success of
computer simulations of paranoid behavior. Thisis described in detail in Section
5.3 and will be considered again in Section 6.
5.1. SOCIOLOGICAL ASPECTS
An entity’s status in a society, in general in a social environment, is often con-
sidered an integral part of its intelligence. Many psychologists believe that social
adaptation, learning and communication are important indications of, even requis-
ites for intelligence. The study of artificial intelligence has also been influenced by
this outlook, as is apparent from the recent research on intelligent agents. Much at-
tention is focused on learning, adaptivity, communication, and sociopsychological
factors in intelligent systems (Collins, 1990; McIlvenny, 1993; Moon et al., 1994).
In 1986, Charles Karelis wrote a paper for theJournal for the Theory of Social
Behavior(Karelis, 1986). This paper summarizes Turing’s original paper (Turing,
1950) and Block’s objections to the TT (Block, 1981), mildly criticizes the test, and
briefly discusses some issues surrounding behaviorist approaches to intelligence.
A few years later, in the same journal, we find "A Simple Comment Regarding
the Turing Test" (Shanon, 1989) by Benny Shanon. The author first mentions the
fact that most discussions of the IG are not faithful to the original formproposed
by Turing. He then continues by criticizing the TT for confining human behavior
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to those that can be conducted by means of the structures and operations that are
available to the computer (Shanon, 1989). He raises the important issue of whether
cognition is autonomous with respect to social interaction, affect, motivation, mo-
tor control, and so on. However, after stating that the TT presupposes the claim
that there is such an autonomy, he abruptly ends his paper by asserting that the
only remaining way to distinguish between man and machine is to "look at them,
touch them, tickle them, perhaps see whether you fall in love with them" (Shanon,
1989, p. 253).
Justin Leiber, in his defense of the TT against Shanon (Leiber, 1989), states that
Shanon seems to be suffering from the ‘unwillingness to admit the possibility that
mankind can have any rivals’ (Turing, 1969) that Turing liked to call the ‘heads-in-
the-sand objection’ (Turing, 1950). Leiber notes that satisfactory answers to such
objections have already been given by Turing. He also argues against Shanon’s
claim that the TT involves only symbol manipulation and thus assumes a repres-
entational/computational framework for cognition. Leiber points out that there is
ample evidence in Turing’s paper (Turing, 1950) showing that such a framework is
not assumed. He asserts that Turing does not make the aforementioned autonomy
presupposition either.
Tracy B. Henley also argues that Shanon is being overly chauvinistic (Henley,
1990). A reply to Henley is given by Shanon in Shanon (1991).
Some of those who view intelligence as a part of social processes (and vice
versa) take a more evolutionary approach (Barresi, 1987; Forsyth, 1988; Schweizer,
1998). Adaptivity is indeed a most prevalent characteristic of social intelligence.
However, the issue can be viewedfrom two different levels: the individual level
and the collective level. The approaches we have looked at above were mainly
individual-based. Evolutionary arguments, on the other hand, are largely collective
in outlook. These usually focus on the intelligence ofspeciesand study the factors
influencing their development. According to the evolutionary viewpoint, there is a
system, i.e., nature, in which entities function and the interactions within the system
have effects on individuals that, in the long run, lead to species-level adaptations.
Adaptation in thiscontext is not merely giving appropriate responses in appropriate
social or physical situations, but is successful survival of the species within the
whole system.
In his 1987 paper (Barresi, 1987), John Barresi considers intelligent machines
as a species and proposes an evolutionary ‘Cyberiad Test’ instead of a Turing Test.
According to Barresi, the TT aims to trick a person, but innatural intelligence, this
person is ‘mother nature’. The Cyberiad Test is similar to the TT: The basis of the
judgment is a comparison between humans and machines. The difference between
the two lies in how intelligence is defined. The Cyberiad Test defines intelligent
behavior as those that are necessary for the society’s survival. The arbiter here, is
mother nature.
According to Barresi, the TT is inferior to the Cyberiad Test because what it
can process about an entity’s intelligence is limited to a particular domain, namely,
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verbal communication. The Cyberiad Test is passed, ‘if [the] society of artificial
men are able to continue a socio-cultural evolution of their own without disintegra-
tion over an extended period, say of several million years’ (Barresi, 1987, p. 23).26
Even though this ‘science fiction’ atmosphere sometimes distracts the reader from
the important assertions about evolutionary and cultural intelligence, the paper is
quite an entertaining piece of work.
5.2. ON GENDER
Judith Genova draws attention to the gender issue in the IG (Genova, 1994b). She,
as we have done in Section 2.1, remarks that Turing’s description of the game
involves, not a question of species, but one of gender. She states in Genova (1994a)
that her aim was to show that the sexual guessing component of the IG is im-
portant, even after the machine enters the picture. Our explanation of this design
choice differs from that of Genova’s, however. We have not made a distinction
between the two genders in our explanation. We regarded the choice of the woman
being ‘imitated’ as a rather insignificant one and assumed that the game would not
change radically if it were the other way around. Genova, on the other hand, does
not merely accept Turing’s choices as accidental, but tries to demonstrate some
motivations behind these.
Genova believes that sexist notions about women being less intelligent, by them-
selves, do not account for the peculiar design of the game. She states that by
complicating the game in this manner, Turingquestions the existence of discrete
categories. In other words, by usingthe male/female issue, he is attempting to
demonstrate that gender itself is a socially imposed concept that is not ‘natural’
the way we usually think it is.
Genova regards the IG as part of Turing’s general philosophy of ‘transgress-
ing boundaries’ (Genova, 1994b). Under the assumption that Turing admired such
transformations that do not conform to the given discrete categories, Genova sug-
gests that Turing might be marking the woman as an inferior thinker because he
believes her to be unable to deceive. The rest of the paper considers Turing’s
hypothetical hope to create a ‘perfect being’ and draws some analogies between
him and Pygmalion. As can be seen, Genova’s approach is different from ours; for
her, Turing’s paper (Turing, 1950) ‘is itself a game’ (Genova, 1994a).
Another paper that considers the gender issue in the IG and constructs links
between the design of the game and Turing’s opinions on life is Jean Lassegue’s
‘What Kind of Turing Test Did Turing Have in Mind?’ (Lassegue, 1996). Those
readers who are interested in Turing’s life and psychology might want to consult it.
5.3. ARTIFICIAL PARANOIA
The TT has received some attention from psychologists as well (Reader, 1969;
Alper, 1990; Galatzer-Levy, 1991). In this section, however, we focus only on
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Kenneth Colby and colleagues’ work on simulating artificial paranoia (Colby et
al., 1971; Colby et al, 1972; Colby, 1981).
In the 70’s, Turing Tests were used to validate computer simulations of paranoid
behavior. Colby et al. describe in their 1971Artificial Intelligencepaper ‘Artificial
Paranoia’ a computer program (called PARRY) that attempts to simulate paranoid
behavior in computer-mediated dialogue. The program emits linguistic responses
based on internal (affective) states. To create this effect, three measures, FEAR,
ANGER, and MISTRUST are used. Depending on the flow of the conversation,
these measures change their values. Substantial detail about the artificial paranoia
program can be found in Colby et al. (1971).
A year later, Colby et al. describe how they validated their simulation program
by a Turing-like indistinguishability test (Colby et al., 1972). Their approach to
such tests is much more practical compared to those of philosophers who argue
against the TT because it is a behaviorist criterion for intelligence. Colby et al.
believe that computersimulations should bevalidated, and that a simulation’s ac-
ceptability must first be based on ‘its success in achieving the desired end of
producing resemblance at some input-output level’ (Colby et al, 1972). Thus, they
view the test as a tool to validate a simulation.
They describe Turing’s original IG and note that there is one important point that
needs to be resolved before the test can actually be used. What the judges aretold
about the game is not explicitly stated in (Turing, 1950). From the context provided,
it seems as if the judges are not told that one of the parties they are conversing with
is a machine. In their work, Colby et al. use this interpretation. Although this has
been a largely overlooked issue, we believe that what exactlythe participants know
about the game can make a big difference (see, for instance Saygin, 1999).
Abelson proposes an "Extended Turing Test". There is a computer program that
attempts to imitate a subject carrying out a task, and there is also another target
person, referred to as thefoil, that differs from the subject in some respect.27 At
first, the judge will try to identify the subject and the foil. At some point, the
computer replaces the foil, but the judge’s task remains unchanged. The com-
puter’s simulation is acceptable if the difference between the success of the judge
in distinguishing the subject from the other is sufficiently small (Abelson, 1968).
Colby et al. designed their validation test in the light of Abelson’s comments.
They devised a machine-mediated interviewing environment, where experienced
psychiatrists corresponded with both real-life paranoid patients and computer pro-
grams through teletype. The judges werenot told that some of the interviewees
could be computer programs. They were asked to rank each interviewee’s level of
paranoia. There were eight judges who interviewed two patients each. In half of
the cases, the first interviewee was a human patient and in the other half, it was the
computer program. Another thirty-three psychiatrists constituted a second set of
judges (referred to as the protocol judges) who were asked to determine levels of
paranoia by reading the transcripts of the conversations carried out by the first set of
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judges. Finally, both sets of judges were asked to identify which of the interviewees
was an actual human being and which was a computer program.
Details of the results can be found in Colby et al (1972), but the overall con-
clusion was that the psychiatric judges did not do better than chance guessing at
identifying the computers from the human patients. In a further test, randomly
selected psychiatrists were sent protocols of two interviews and were asked to
judge which one is a program and which one is a real patient. Only 48% made
the correct identification, which is also a chance level.
Paranoid people are expected to display irrational and obsessive behavior from
time to time. This fact makes the task of the simulation program easy, for defi-
ciencies in linguistic processing of the inputs and generation of the outputs can
seem to be indicative of a psychological problem. One interesting point is that the
paranoia simulation program does not useanysophisticated linguistic techniques.
Input sentences are assumed to be syntactically simple, and the operation of the
program relies on spotting some keywords. No parsing or sense disambiguation
is done. Even without sophisticated linguistic techniques, the program can attain
some success in modeling human behavior. Apparently, this is possible only be-
cause the problem area is such that irrelevant responses from the interviewees are
expected.
Still, the simple design of the program indicates that by finding appropriate
internal parameters and correlations of these with the flow of the conversation, one
can model the behavior of one kind of human being without using much natural
language analysis. Because the representational model of the paranoid mind used
in the program is a good approximation of the paranoia-related cognitive processes
in humans, and because lack of linguistic competence can be accommodated in the
setting, the program can be successful. In modeling human beings in general, the
former is not so easy to discover and formalize, and the latter is not the case.
6. Chatbots
We have reached the end of the century, but what hasre lly been done in terms
of passing the TT? Over the years, many natural language systems have been de-
veloped with different purposes, including that of carrying out conversations with
human users.28 These systems chat with people on the WWW, play MUDs,29 give
information about specific topics, tell stories, and enter Turing Test competitions.
However, none has been able topassthe TT so far.
6.1. THE LOEBNER PRIZE CONTEST
The TT has never been carried out in exactly the same way Turing originally de-
scribed it. However, there are variants of the original in which computer programs
participate and show their skills in "humanness". Since 1991, Hugh Loebner has
been organizing the so-called annual Loebner Prize Competition.30 Although views
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as to whether this annual contest is to be taken seriously vary immensely among
the AI community, it nevertheless continues to be the most well-known forum for
attempts to pass the TT. The first program to pass an unrestricted TT will win a gold
medal and $100,000,31 while each year, a bronze medal and $2,000 is awarded to
the most "human" program among the contestants. Since 1995, all entries must
be prepared to be queried on any topic whatsoever. No program has won the grand
prize yet, but the quality of the participating programs seems to be increasing every
year.
The first Loebner Prize Contest was held at Boston’s Computer Museum. Six
computer programs, four human subjects and ten human interrogators were in-
volved.32 The administrative committee was headed by Daniel Dennett, a very
respectable figure in the philosophy and cognitive science community. The or-
ganizing committee, thinking that it was not possible at the time for a computer
program to pass the TT as originally defined, decided that the conversation topics
were to be restricted, both for the contestants and confederates. Consequently, the
judges were asked to stay on topic during their interrogations. Substantial detail
about the 1991 Loebner Prize Contest can be found in Epstein (1992). The reader
can also consult Mauldin (1994) and Platt (1995) for more information on other
years’ contests.
A widely discussed issue before 1995 was the restricted vs. unrestricted TT.
According to Turing, passing a restricted TT would not suffice for intelligence.
However, from another viewpoint restricted tests are not totally useless. We are not
saying that they should be carried out within the context of the Loebner compe-
tition. Still, restricted tests can be devised to assess the success of more specific
AI applications that are not created with passing the TT in mind. Examples of
systems that can be assessed by a restricted test are intelligent tutoring systems,
computer help services, and natural language components of other applications
that are designed for specific domains. The reader can also consult Shieber (1994)
and Loebner (1994) for more discussion on restricted TT’s and the Loebner com-
petition.
In the Loebner contest, the sexual guessing component of the original game is
ignored. The aim of the contestants is to convince the judges that they are human.
One or more human confederates also participate and try to aid the judges in
identifying the humans. The judges also rank the terminals with respect to their
"human-ness". Although, looking at the transcripts, one can see that the computer
programs are, in general, obviously distinguishable from the real humans, there
have been cases in which some actual humans were ranked less human than some
computer programs. In fact, in 1991, not only were some programs thought to be
human beings, but an actual human was mistaken for a computer program because
of her impeccable knowledge of Shakespearean literature.33 The interested reader
is referred to the article written by Charles Platt, one of the human confederates in
the 1994 Loebner Contest (Platt, 1995).
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The amount of time that the judges spend communicating with each terminal in
the Loebner competition varies. It has been the case thateach judge gets more than
one chance to interrogate each terminal. Ideally, the contestants should be able to
handle conversations of unlimited duration as well as multiple sessions with each
judge. In the beginning, each judge was required to rank the subjects from the least
human to the most human. They also had to mark the point at which they believed
the subjects switched from computer programs to human beings.
It is difficult to keep track of the small changes in the rules. It is, for instance, not
clear how the grand prize of $100,000 will be awarded. The 1999 rules state that if
a contestant achieves a 50:50 chance of being mistaken for a human being, it will
be given an intermediate Turing award of $25,000 and appropriate competitions
(those that involve audio and video inputs) will be held after that. However, how
this ratio is exactly calculated is not elucidated. We also feel the number of judges
is too small to be a basis for a statistic like 50:50.
One of the aims of the Loebner competition, according to Loebner, is to ad-
vance the field of artificial intelligence. A majority of researchers believe that this
competition does not, and is not likely to serve such a purpose. Some hold that
it is possible that a program implemented as an entry to the competition could
evolve into a useful natural language system. It is also possible that by raising an
interest in the topic, the contest may prompt researchers to start working on such
systems. Nevertheless, the competition has received some harsh comments from
many leading scientists and philosophers.34
The quality of the programs that compete in the contest has been increasing.
The first programs that participated in the Loebner Prize Contests were little more
than slightly modified ELIZAs. One need only look at more recent transcripts or
play with some of these programs to see that there is progress. It seems awards can
get people interested in writing TT-passing programs. Hence, the Loebner Prize
could indeed be influential on AI research.
We would like to finish this section with a small excerpt from a conversation
between the winner of the 1996 Loebner Prize, HeX, and a particularly emotional
judge:35
PROGRAM. . . So what do you do for a living?
JUDGE05 I think. I do research. I write. I love. I Live.
PROGRAM I wonder whether you think sometimes! I am feeling like the
judge here!
JUDGE05 HUh?
6.2. TRICKS OF THE TRADE
The first, and probably the most well-known natural language system that has been
programmed is ELIZA. Joseph Weizenbaum coded ELIZA at MIT during the years
1964–1966. This "friendly" program simulates a Rogerian psychotherapist. It re-
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phrases the interrogator’s statements as questions and urges him/her to continue
talking. The mechanism behind ELIZA is a very simple one. First, what is typed
into the program is parsed. Then, a suitable reply is formulated by simple pattern
recognition and substitution of keywords (Weizenbaum, 1966). The term "ELIZA-
like" for chatbots is used to mean that the program tries to carry the conversation
by using techniques similar to those of ELIZA.
ELIZA would perform poorly in the Loebner contests or similar instantiations
of the TT. This is because the interrogators are trying to find out whether they
are conversing with a human or a machine and thus they are not likely to open up
about themselves and their personal problems as if they are talking to a psychother-
apist. However, it has been reported that some people have developed emotional
attachments to ELIZA (Weizenbaum, 1976). Certain psychiatrists went so far as to
suggest that such programs could replace psychotherapists altogether. Weizenbaum
himself has been amazed by these delusions that ELIZA, a simple program, could
induce in perfectly normal people.
These reactions to ELIZA suggest that even if the program has no chance to pass
the TT, it can be said to model, with success, some aspects of the conversational
capability of one kind of human being, namely, the Rogerian psychotherapist.
A similar story is that of PARRY, which is a program that attempts to simulate
another restricted class of human beings. Kenneth Colby wrote this program in the
70’s in order to model the paranoid mind. A modified TT in which an experienced
psychiatrist tries to distinguish between a real paranoid patient and the computer
program can be carried out to assess how well the paranoid conversational char-
acteristics are simulated. Many expert psychiatrists had difficulty making the dis-
tinction between PARRY and actual paranoids. The design of PARRY has been
explained in detail in Section 5.3.
Both ELIZA and PARRY use certain tricks to be able to successfully perform in
conversations. ELIZA directs the conversation away from herself by asking ques-
tions. Many people like this36 and happily believe that the program is listening as
they talk about themselves. ELIZA uses parts of the user’s input in the output ques-
tions and seems to be following the conversation. In addition to these techniques,
PARRY has little stories to tell and tends to insert these in the conversation.
Recent programs also employ many tricks. Joseph Weintraub’s PC Therapist,
which won the first three Loebner competitions, and also the one in 1995, is a
master ofnon sequitur. Overall, the program was ELIZA-like but impressed the
judges by its long and incomprehensible responses. Its success is understandable
in the first three Loebner contests since the conversation topics were limited and
the judges actually expected irrelevant, absurd, and extravagant answers from a
terminal that boasted "whimsical talk". The reader is referred to Epstein (1992) for
transcripts of PC Therapist in the 1991 contest, which are illustrative of the tricks
it employs.
PC Therapist’s winning the first unrestricted Loebner competition shows that
the usage ofnon sequituris indeed, a powerful trick. We find the utilization of
TURING TEST: 50 YEARS LATER 505
non sequitursimilar to that of simulating typing mistakes of humans: In the long
run, such tricks will not suffice by themselves, but they can be incorporated into
otherwise successful programs as seen necessary. Below are some excerpts that
may give an idea about the performance of Weintraub’s program in 1995. It can
be seen that if the judge asks sensible, down to earth questions, the program’s
responses seem erratic and irritating, especially when it repeats long chunks of the
judge’s previous inputs in unrelated contexts:
JUDGE06 What did you have for dinner yesterday? Keep in mind I’m a strtct
vegetarian.
PROGRAM I could swear you just said what did you do yesterday at 7:83
p.m.?? He was so narrow-minded he could see through a key-hole with two
eyes. Are such questions on your mind?
JUDGE06 What did you have for dinner yesterday?
PROGRAM What does a woman want anyway? What answer would please you
most?
However, depending on the attitude of the interrogator there can exist an atmo-
sphere (or rather illusion) of mutual understanding.
PROGRAM Is love the most important thing to you? How important is that to
you?
JUDGE05 essential cure to my existential schizophrenia.
PROGRAM A striking example of the essential identity of the two tongues.
existential schizophrenia, that’s amusing.
. . .
PROGRAM You know the old saying – fun is in the eye of the beholder!.
What do you think?
JUDGE05 the "beholder" is the central issue. confusion reigns because of the
illusion of "identity."
PROGRAM I love men, not because they are men, but because they are not
women. Is that the real reason?
JUDGE05 I love all that is, which has produced me to observe it, yet given me
the madness to think I am distinct ans apart from it.
PROGRAM I have this fantasy of making love to two women in one year.
Can you elaborate on that?
JUDGE05 why confine love to only two
PROGRAM Is love the most important thing to you? What comes to your mind
when you ask that?
Another trick that has been used is to direct the conversation by talking a lot
about a predefined topic. This has been used and abused, and the difference shows.
Programs that cheat by typing very long responses extremely slowly give away
the fact that they are trying to use up the interrogation time. However, the winner
of the 1997 Loebner competition, Converse, uses the conversation-directing tech-
nique rather impressively. It begins the session by asking the interrogator about
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something interesting that had been on the news the previous night. Below are
excerpts from the 1997 contest transcripts of Converse:
PROGRAM Well, it’s nice to meet you, Elliot. Did you see that story on CNN
last night about the lesbian couple who came out at a White House party on
Sunday?
JUDGE04 Yes, I did. I think it may be a publicity stunt for Ellen.
PROGRAM Ellen Degeneres was one of them – she was kissing her lover in
front of Bill Clinton. Do you think he was very embarrassed?
JUDGE04 I think he want the gay vote. He will do anything to get it and keep
it. He does not have a conservative base.
PROGRAM Are you still a friend of Bill Clinton?
JUDGE04 I am not sure if he has any real friends. He has achieved alot and
left alot of people behind.
PROGRAM You really don’t like the guy – well, at least that’s definite – I
thought most people were indifferent or numb by now.
PROGRAM Well, it’s nice to meet you Tracy. Did you see that story on CNN
last night about the lesbian couple who came out at a White House party on
Sunday?
JUDGE03 No... Are you serious? Who?
PROGRAM I’m pretty much that way today. No idea who do you? Hm, I was
just saying Ellen Degeneres was one of them – she was kissing her lover in
front of Bill Clinton. Do you think he was very embarrassed?
JUDGE03 I doubt it very much. From what I’ve heard, Bill’s been, done and
seen just about everything there is for a consenting adult to see.
PROGRAM Are you still a friend of Bill Clinton?
JUDGE03 Never was.
PROGRAM You really don’t like the guy – well, at least that’s definite – I
thought most people were indifferent or numb by now.
It is possible to see, after reading the full transcripts, that the program repeats al-
most exactly the same response sequence to each judge regardless of what they type
in. But the judges could not know this, and the overall effect is quite impressive.
The program spent a lot of the time in this manner, and although it could not handle
many kinds of questions, it won the competition. The program that came second,
Jason Hutchens’ SEPO, was more competent in handling diverse questions.37 In
any case, directing the conversation creates a more sophisticated impression than
simply repeating the input back to the interrogator or asking ELIZA-like questions.
The situation is similar to watching a team play in the offensive rather than in the
defensive.
As was mentioned before, one approach to chatterbot development is to model
one particular "character". Thom Whalen took this a step further than what has
been done with ELIZA and PARRY, and created an actual human being, Joe the
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Janitor. Although he lost the Loebner contest to Weintraub in 1995, the program
was quite successful.
Joe has a narrow world view since he works at nights, does not read books
or newspapers, and does not watch TV. In addition, he has a little story to tell
about being accused of theft and fear of losing his job.These tricks are similar to
those employed in the design of PARRY. The major weakness of Joe was that he
did not resort tonon sequiturand repeated the same responses when confronted
with something he didn’tknowabout. Below, we produce some excerpts from the
transcripts to depict what can go right or wrong with Whalen’s approach:
JUDGE04 where do you work?
PROGRAM At the university. I mostly clean the Standish Building.
JUDGE04 What university?
PROGRAM University of Eastern Ontario. I’m a cleaner. I empty trash. Va-
cuum. Dust. You know.
JUDGE04 and why do they want to fire you?
PROGRAM It’s just because my boss, Mr. Johnson, is mad at me.
JUDGEO4 why is he mad at you?
PROGRAM I didn’t do nothing wrong. But he thinks I did. It’s all because of
that radio they think I stole from the lab.
JUDGE04 that’s too bad. are you in a union?
PROGRAM What would I tell the union? They won’t say they’re firing me
because I stole the radio. They’ll just make up some excuse. . .
. . .
JUDGE02 what does nato stand for?
PROGRAM I don’t know.
JUDGE02 what’s your name?
PROGRAM What’s your name?? I don’t know. What do I look like? Some kind
of professor?
JUDGE02 What was mark twain’s real first name?
PROGRAM Huh?
JUDGE02 what does huh mean?
PROGRAM Beats me.
JUDGE02 huh?




PROGRAM I don’t know.
Another of Whalen’s strategies, as he reports in (Whalen, 1995),was to program
suitable responses to common questions on topics that people usually talk about
when they first meet, like their names,38 where they live, the weather, etc. It is
obviously a good idea to have these responses prepared in case the interrogator
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introduces such topics. In fact, some judges at some Loebner competitions make
only small talk on such topics. However, generally the judges do not treat the
competitors as if they are people they’ve recently met. They may ask questions
that nobody would ask people they have just met.39
Apparently, the judges of the 1995 Loebner competition were not very inter-
ested in Joe’s little story and although they admitted that it was the terminal with
the most human personality (which should be a quality that the competitors are
trying to achieve) they ranked Weintraub’s program above it. For more detail about
Joe and its performance in the 1995 Loebner Prize Contest, see Whalen (1995).
6.3. WHAT ELSE SHOULD BE DONE?
In chatbot design, first and foremost, a good grammar unit is necessary. Most
programs are rather poor in this respect and their tricks do not go much beyond
pronoun transposition. It seems a good idea to employ more sophisticated natural
language processing methods. It could be argued that usage of perfect grammar
is not crucial since it is quite rare that humans use perfect grammar in informal
transactions. If a program’s responses are grammatically perfect, some interroga-
tors may decide that no human can use English so impeccably.40 However, most
programs err in ways that give away the fact that they are machines. When in-
terrogators feel they are talking to a machine, they literallyttack it in order to
fully reveal its identity. A good strategy for the TT is indisputably that of trying to
maintain human-ness (or at least the neutrality) for as long as possible. It becomes
very difficult for the machine to make the interrogator believe that it is human after
he/she has his/her mind set on "unmasking" the poor thing.
A promising approach is to develop programs that can learn. The reader might
recall that Turing discussed these extensively (Section 2.3). Although such pro-
grams that have been developed so far do not seem very sophisticated, the approach
is logical and is likely to yield good results in the long run. Some learning chatbots
boast the capacity to converse in any given language. However, there seems to be
a tradeoff between the sophistication and the number of languages any one system
can learn. In designing natural language learning systems, knowledge from psy-
chology and cognitive science can be employed in order to model human language
acquisition. In fact, work has been done in this line, but not with the intention of
producing computer programs to pass the TT. Another option is using mathematical
and statistical techniques to represent word sequences and probabilities of them
occurring in proximity.
We expect many of the chatbots in the future to use learning methods. Already,
those programs that do not keep track of the current conversation (relying solely
on text processing tricks) perform poorly compared to those that learn from the
interrogators. As the quality of the conversational systems increase, we believe
more developers will integrate learning components into their programsand teach
them in ways that maximize their performance.
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Overall, when one looks at the transcripts from the Loebner Prize Contests and
talks to some chatbots, one realizes the better programs integrate the techniques
above. They have a personality and history, they try to ask questions and initiate
new conversations, they produce grammatically correct responses, they have some
information about recent happenings (like new movies, albums, gossip), they learn
about and from the interrogators and when they don’t know what to say, they try
to respond by combining words from the interrogator’s input in order to come up
with a relevant answer.
7. Discussion and Conclusion
Having analyzed the ‘50 years of the Turing Test’, we will now conclude our survey
with a brief look at some main issues about the TT and, of course, its future.
Our stands on the issues are not at the extremes. Perhaps this is because we
have tried to be objective in our analyses of the arguments for and against the TT.
Most of the arguments discussed in this paper are strong, and if read independently,
can "convince" the reader. However, looking at the 50 years as a whole, we find it
difficult to adopt a simple viewpoint.
We will now discuss some important issues regarding the TT and provide our
own answers to (and interpretations of) these.
• Why did Turing propose such a strange game?
We discussed this question at length in Section 2.1. Some comments have been
made on the issue (for instance Genova, 1994b; Lassegue, 1996; Abelson, 1968)
but we think the best explanation is the one we provided: In the IG, the machine
is supposed to be as good as a man who is imitating a woman. This gender-based
design might be a methodological choice. We are asking the machine to imitate
something which it isn’t; so it is only fair that we compare its success against a
human who isalso imitating something which it isn’t.
• Is the TT an operational definition?
Parts of Turing’s paper (the percentages, the predictions about the future, etc.)
would prompt us to believe that he intended it as such. However, most arguments
surrounding the issue have been philosophical. Neither Searle’s Chinese Room,
nor Block’s Aunt Bubbles machine are practically realizable, yet they have been
proposed with the intention of refuting the TT as a measure of intelligence. Appar-
ently proponents of such thought experiments and some other commentators view
the TT as a philosophical criterion.
Viewed as a practical test, we see the TT as follows: If a machine passes the
TT, it should be granted intelligence. However, if it cannot,we cannot say for sure
whether it thinks or not. This is probably the most common stance towards the TT.
Philosophically, the test has been subject to many criticisms. We are all familiar
with the anti-behaviorist attacks. Some have also noted that the TT is anthropo-
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morphic. It is true that the TT tests for human-like intelligence. We should not be
too bothered about this for it is only natural that we are interested in the only kind
of intelligence we know.41
Moreover, we need not assert that theonlyway to grant intelligence to machines
is by the TT. Perhaps a good way to see the TT is as a means of gathering inductive
evidence about machine mentality (Section 3.4).
Lately, many arguments on the TT have been of the "put up or shut up" sort (e.g.,
Harnad, 1989; Leiber, 1995). With the advances in computer technology, cognitive
science, and artificial intelligence, it is time we stipulate that attackers or defenders
of the TT back up their arguments with something more than mere intuition. This
does not mean that everyone should try to develop TT-passing computer programs.
However, to argue for or against the TT, we believe that a more or less realizable
method of passing the test should be proposed.
• Isn’t the TT guilty of behaviorism?
We are not saying there should be tests to assess machine intelligence, but if we
have to make a choice, TT-like tests seem to be the best method for reasoning
about machines’ minds even though they may be accused of behaviorism. If, one
day, we stop granting intelligence to other human beings in behaviorist ways, then
the TT could be replaced by some other method. As of today, we believe behavioral
evidence is the best evidence we have for other minds.
The idea of a TT-passing machine having radically different information pro-
cessing compared to humans is not scary. If this happens one day, it will just have
to be ‘heads-out-of-the-sand’.
• Isn’t the TT too easy?
The TT has been criticized for being a limited test since it enables the assessment
of only "verbal" intelligence. However, it does not follow from this that the test is
too easy.
Proponents of this view should come up with a realizable model of a machine
that passes the TT and then prove that this model does not deserve to be called
intelligent. If a simple "bag of tricks" passes the TT, we are willing to either admit
that the TT is too easy or that the human mind is a simple bag of tricks as well. But
after 50 years, all that we have are some very rudimentary chatbots (Section 6),
serendipitous FSAs (Bringsjord, 1994), unrealizable Chinese rooms (Searle, 1980)
and Aunt Bubbles machines (Block, 1981, 1995).
• Isn’t the TT too difficult?
Some researchers claim that the TT is difficult (e.g., French, 1990; Saygin, 1999).
We agree, and believe that this is primarily due to our limited understanding of
natural intelligence, more precisely language understanding, generation and pro-
cessing in humans. It may even turn out that these processes are impossible to
model on computers.
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Is this a deficiency of the TT? Not if one does not require success in the TT
as a necessary condition for machine intelligence. Computers, even today, perform
many tasks that would require intelligence if done by humans. Research and de-
velopment in this line is valuable and worthwhile. A natural language system that
answers queries on a particular topic is certainly a remarkable product. It is not
useless just because it cannot pass the TT. In our opinion, the TT is a sufficient
condition for human-like intelligence (or more appropriately, mentality) because
of the reasons outlined above. It may be too difficult to pass the TT, but this does
not prevent AI from building intelligent machines.
• Why bother about the TT?
As we saw, there are those who believe that the TT is harmful for AI (Hayes and
Ford, 1995; Whitby, 1996). If AI’s aim is to make computers perform "intelligent"
tasks and thereby make life easier for humans, we grant it that TT-passing programs
are not very useful from that perspective.
AI researchers are being unjustly blamed for mankind’s failure in making ma-
chines that can pass the TT. This, we believe, is precisely the reason behind some
of the harsh reactions to the TT from the AI community. Even if we take an extreme
viewpoint and stipulate that AI’s ultimate goal is to produce TT-passing machines,
we should accept that this is a hard problem and give it more time. If AI researchers
are less inclined to shun the TT because "it gives the field a bad name", maybe more
can be done in the positive direction.
Recall the "myth" of Newton and the apple. Recall Archimedes and his adven-
tures in bathing. The apple might be silly, but gravity is not. Of course, thousands
of people bathe, thousands of apples fall. The point is, sometimes a scientist can
focus on an apple and behind it, find gravity. Later, you may forget about the apple,
or even eat it if you like.
The TT may seem like a game. But trying to make computers communicate with
humans in natural language is a task that may also provide valuable insights into
how the human mind works, which is unarguably of scientific and philosophical
interest.
• So what happens now?
We have failed to fulfill Turing’s prophecy in the first 50 years of the TT. We should
admit that we have a difficult task at hand.
Hopefully, we have shown that many critics of the TT have expected too much,
too early. Seeing the TT as the ultimate goal of AI will make many remarkable
achievements look weak. The situation is somewhat reminiscent of "Fermat’s last
theorem" from mathematics which was proved recently by Andrew Wiles, after
centuries of failure. Practically nobody believes that Fermat had proved the the-
orem at the time he scribbled something about lack of space in the margin of his
book more than 300 years ago. In fact, Wiles relies upon mathematical theory that
was not developed until long after Fermat died. The same might be true of the TT.
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Maybe we simply don’t have the requisite theory at this time. Of course, passing
the TT may be "impossible", but none of the counter-arguments proposed so far
suffice to establish such a bold claim.
The TT is, after all, about simulating human use of language by computers. This
raises many questions: How do humans use language in similar settings? What is
the relation between language and cognition? Is language autonomous with respect
to other cognitive abilities? How can computers be made tounderstandlanguage?
What does a "simulation" mean, anyway? There are many more questions like
these. These are all big questions that psychologists, computer scientists, philo-
sophers and linguists have been probing for years. The better we are able to answer
these questions, the closer we will be to passing the TT. We do not know how long
it will be until the TT is passed. Perhaps it is best to relax and not regard the TT
as a "goal" but as a feat that will (if at all) be achieved through an accumulation
of other remarkable feats. Everyone who considers himself/herself a "cognitive
scientist" may, explicitly or implicitly, be working towards passing the TT. In any
case, we believe he/she would at least be interested in what is going on in the TT
arena.
We believe that in about fifty years’ time, someone will be writing a paper titled
"Turing Test: 100 Years Later".
Notes
1For information on Turing refer to the excellent biography by Andrew Hodges (Hodges, 1983) or
the Alan Turing page at http://www.turing.org.uk/turing, also maintained by Hodges.
2For instance, the discussion of Searle’s Chinese Room is kept short (Section 4.2), not because it is
irrelevant or unimportant, but because there is an abundance of excellent resources on the subject.
Conversely, Ned Block’s arguments are described in more detail (Section 4.1) because not many
in-depth analyses of them appear in the literature.
3Turing suggests that the best strategy for her would most probably be giving truthful answers to the
questions.
4This inadvertently figures in the final result, but indirectly.
5Although even simple devices like calculators are better at this than average human beings, it is
rare that a mathematical whiz who can multiply 8-digit numbersin seconds is regarded as being of
ordinary intellect.
6Readers are referred to Section 2.3 of this paper, Turing (1950, pp. 454–460), and Turing (1969, pp.
14–23) for very entertaining and insightful comments onmachine learning by Turing.
7Although the reference cited was published in 1969, Turing originally wrote the paper in 1948.
8Turing seems to believe that brains of newborn babies are tabula rasa. However, he also considers
the opposite position and states that we might encode the information at various kinds of status
levels (e.g., established facts, conjectures, statements given by an authority) and thereby implies that
we may model any ‘innateness’ there may be (Turing, 1950, pp. 457–458).
9Although the cover of the 1950 issue reads "A Quarterly Review of Philosophy and Psychology",
we find it not too inappropriate to callMind a philosophy journal.
10As opposed to Millar, who believes this to be true, and also that this is a virtue of the imitation
game (Millar, 1973).
11The three mentioned by Block are the Chisholm-Geach, perfect actor, and paralytic and brain-in-
vat arguments. Detailed discussion of these is beyond the scope of this work and is not crucial to the
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understanding of what follows. The interested reader is referred to Block (1981, pp. 11–12) and the
references provided there.
12See Block (1981, p. 18).
13Consider, however the following situation: If every once in a while, upon verbal inputA the
machine transformed a sentenceB in A into B and proceeded accordingly (this can be likened to
a mutation), would it count as intelligent because of this little trick of non-determinism?
14See, for instance, Chomsky (1975).
15Aunt Bubbles appears momentarily, as Aunt Bertha, in Block (1981) too.
16This question was adapted from Johnson-Laird (1988).
17Basically the term given to the natural human tendency and ability to ascribe mental states to others
and to themselves (Watt, 1996).
18During the discussions the first author held after a talk on the Turing Test (at the Cognitive Science
Colloquium held at the Middle East Technical University, Ankara, in November, 1998) many parti-
cipants, who did not previously know about the topicroposedthe ITT as a better means to detect
human-ness of machines. These people had not read or heard of Watt’s paper and neither the ITT
nor naive psychology was discussed during the presentation. Maybe this can be explained as "naive
psychology at work".
19In Schweizer’s paper, the abbreviation TTTT is used. We prefer to use TRTTT so as to avoid
confusion with Harnad’s Total Total Turing Test, previously referred to as TTTT.
20See Barresi (1987) and Section 5.
21Here, low-level cognitive structure refers to the subconscious associative network in human minds,
consisting of highly overlapping activatable representations of experience (French, 1990, p. 57).
22French believes that this assumption is tacitly made by Turing. The importance of culture in con-
versation and communication is immense (see Section 5) and thiscould be a reasonable stipulation.
23In French’s terminology, these human subjects are calledint rviewees.
24The importance of cultural factors becomes evident in this context. Without having notions of
Kellogg’s and teddy bears, the answers to these questions would be near-random guesses.
25Although Leiber is mainly concerned with the homunculi argument in ‘Troubles with Function-
alism’ (Block, 1978), his response also applies to Block’s attack of the TT described in Section
4.1.
26Compare this with Schweizer (1998) and Section 4.4.4.
27In Turing’s IG, this difference is gender, for instance.
28Such systems are usually called language understanding/generation systems, conversation agents,
or simply, chatbots.
29Multi-User Dungeons: These are games played interactively on the Internet by multiple players.
30http://www.loebner.net/Prizef/loebner-prize.html
31Now, Loebner requires that this program should also be able to process audio/visual input.
32In the Loebner Prize terminology, the computer programs are called ‘contestants’, the human
subjects ‘confederates’ and the interrogators ‘judges’.
33The reason why this does not mean that the TT has been passed is simply because Turing required
consistentlysuccessful performance from machines to grant them intelligence.
34In fact, Marvin Minsky has offered $100 to the first person who can get Hugh Loebner to revoke
the competition, which he calls an ‘obnoxious and unproductive annual publicity campaign’. Loebner
astutely declared Minsky a co-sponsor of the contest, since, according to the rules, when the grand
prize is won, the contest will not be held again. In that case, with Minsky’s contribution, the prize
should become $100,100.
35In the following transcript and the others in this section, the spelling and grammar errors have not
been corrected. However, timing information denotingthe exact response times of the participants
has been deleted.
36Although, contest judges most probably would not, as was mentioned before.
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37An interesting point was that one of the judges was named ‘Nate’, short for‘Nathan’. The program
repeatedly addressed him as ‘Mate’, and complained abouthim not telling his name. This created the
impression that SEPO lacked intelligence,but was, in fact, due to the fact that Jason Hutchens is from
Australia. This suggeststhat the designer’s mind is an integral component of the resulting programs,
whichis an interesting idea to consider.
38Although, as seen above, Joe cannot answer the question "What is your name?".
39One of the judges in the 1997 Loebner competition tried asking each terminal thequestion "When
you got your first liscence (sic), was it in a stick or an automatic?".The question is a cleverly planned
one since words like ‘driving’ or ‘car’ are notused, but the meaning is clear from the context. Even the
misspelling of the word ‘license’ as ‘liscence’ is most probably intentional. Almost anyone (certainly
any adult American) would be able to give a relevant answer to this question, but it is difficult to
develop a computer program answering trick questions such as this.
40One might recall that Eliza Doolittle was mistaken for a Hungarian princess because she spoke
English too well for a native.
41Moreover, it is not even evident that other "kinds" of intelligence can be conceived of by human
beings. The interested reader may refer to Minsky (1985) for a good discussion of this issue.
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